The forked tongue of US policy on the Asia Pacific

Written by: Nick G. on 21 August 2026

 

 
(The US ruling class has always been duplicitous, as the First Nations discovered.  Wikimedia Commons public domain)

 

The US Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eldridge Colby, yesterday held a virtual media briefing whilst on a visit to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.

Colby said “America’s interests are more engaged than ever in the Indo-Pacific, and that we at the Department of War are concentrated on ensuring those interests are stoutly defended. This means a strong and growing U.S. investment in the region.”

 

He also addressed the renaming of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) back to its previous name of the Pacific Command (PACOM), stressing that it was not seeking to undermine the importance of the Indian Ocean and the South Asian countries. 

 

“The change back to PACOM has multiple reasons, but I think what I would stress here is that the strategic focus of the United States military is really — and consistent with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy — is on the first island chain,” he said.

 

The first island chain refers to the islands and island nations stretching from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula down to Peninsular Malaysia that includes the Kuril Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo.

 

“And so the Pacific element to that is really the focus, the Western Pacific area, obviously stretching into Southeast Asia here. Again, that’s the strategic logic,” he said.

 

In a reference to Australia that will surely sicken many of us, he said “I think one of the things that we’ve been impressed with our close ally — no better ally, Australia — is that Australia really sees things through the lens of collective defense and a strategy of deterrence by denial designed to sustain a balance of power in this key region,” adding that he saw an “alignment in thinking” between Australia and the US. 

 

Declaring that the strategic focus of the US military is on the first island chain is really a declaration that for the US, preparation for war with China is its strategic focus. And he knows enough about his Empire loyalists in the Australian government, armed forces and senior bureaucrats to express confidence in their “alignment in thinking” with that of their masters.

 

Saying one thing but meaning another

 

Colby’s statement seems to run counter to recent pronouncement from the boss of US imperialism, Donald Trump.

 

On his May 2026 meeting with Xi Jinping in China, Trump appeared to back away from endorsing Taiwanese independence, indicating a “four noes” policy on the Taiwan question, clearly signalling that he is unwilling to become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and that he opposes reckless moves toward “Taiwan independence.”

 

Trump’s “four noes” mean "not looking to have somebody go independent," not wanting US troops "to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war," not backing "Taiwan independence," and noncommittal to continued arms sales to the island of Taiwan.

 

And just recently, he has used his Truth Social account to make the following statement on North Korea.  We reproduce it in full:

 

Based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un, of North Korea, I am not happy with the fact that the United States has, long ago, agreed to participate in Joint Military Exercises with South Korea. These exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the United States of America (as usual!), but send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile, to a Country that, as long as Donald J. Trump has been President, has been unthreatening and respectful. Therefore, and based on the fact that it is too late to cancel, I have instructed Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, to substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises! While somewhat unrelated (?), I recently asked the President of South Korea if they would like to join us in the Denuclearization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and they said, “No thanks!” Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP

 

Now, of course, you could trust Trump as far as you could spit from a dry mouth on a hot day, but there do appear to be some inconsistencies between the Colby statement and the words of the President.

 

US imperialism is headed by the President of the US, and Trump has his idiosyncracies. But contradiction exists in all things: the US Department of State has its own agenda, the US military-industrial complex has its own interests, and the "hawks" in the US Congress have their own political stage. Behind all of this is US capital and the corporations, banks and financial entities that own it. Whilst the latter group has its common interests, it also has its sectional interests and rivalries. 

 

All of this means that we must judge US imperialism by what it does and what it is planning to do. 

 

One indicator is last month’s 31-nation Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) wargames. The Department of War proceeded from the assumption that having supply lines stretched over thousands of miles, a future war with China would strain US logistics. So, a major part of RIMPAC for the US was to test whether the military could manufacture key spare parts on demand, even aboard ships at sea through a new, networked approach to 3D printers and other high-tech tools they call distributed advanced manufacturing.

 

What is happening in military exercises is also being enunciated in new policy documents.

 

A new science and technology strategy released this week by the White House outlines a comprehensive, four-tiered priority scheme for military tech, from AI to quantum.

 

At the base of the pyramid are “key enabling technologies” that support three higher-priority techs. These enablers range from advanced manufacturing (e.g. 3D printers) to hypersonics, nuclear energy, and semiconductors.

 

At the top of the pyramid are the “three priority areas for U.S. battlefield dominance and power projection”:

 

• undersea superiority, both for submarines and anti-submarine warfare;

• space, meaning the ability to not just “detect” threats but also “counter” them, from low orbit to the Moon; and

• AI and autonomy, a “rapidly evolving area” which the strategy doesn’t define as clearly as the other two, but which in prior Pentagon usage has meant everything from strategic planning software to swarming drones.

 

In each of these three priority areas, there is concern that the US is falling behind China, hence the preparation for war in the South China Sea and the Pacific tops the list and incorporates the AUKUS arrangements, facilitated by their lackeys here and that “alignment in thinking”.

 

There is no point trying to take Trump at his word. He and the other component parts of the system of US imperialism speak with a forked tongue.

 

Watch their actions, not their words.

'Dispersed operations': Pentagon upgrades the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Written by: (Contributed) on 2 June 2026

 

(Source: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0)

Official announcements from the Pentagon that the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is being upgraded into a “new defense architecture taking shape across the Indo-Pacific” have revealed far more about the changing balance of forces taking place across the wider region than the US is usually prepared to divulge. A down-scaling of the importance of Guam for hosting sensitive defence and security facilities has taken place due to China's increased capacity to hit the Micronesian islands with missiles; they have been assessed by the Pentagon as vulnerable.

Alternative sitings for the Guam facilities have, therefore, been identified; other geo-strategic military facilities, including those in Australia, have also been subject to quick relocation procedures. The moves carry all the hallmarks of serious preparations by the US for 'real-war scenarios' in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Pentagon has acknowledged a changing balance of forces is taking place across the vast Indo-Pacific region; China has moved from being a competitor to traditional US hegemonic positions toward establishing primacy in some areas.

Regional US defence and security provision has, historically, included the role of sensitive intelligence facilities based at Pine Gap in Central Australia, being linked to a hub on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and their counterpart based on Guam in Micronesia. The two hubs swing on an arc from Pine Gap and have been upgraded for military operations, linked to Darwin Harbour as a support centre for deployments.

Revelations, therefore, that Guam has been assessed by the Pentagon as well within the range of later designed Chinese missiles, has caused the US military to re-organise part of their regional defence and security provision; Guam, itself, is regarded as a target. (1) Recognition of the problem, by the Pentagon, also acknowledges China's range and sophistication of military satellites for intelligence-gathering and planning of operations.

The fact that Guam rests upon the Second Island Chain, used by the US to block China's access and egress into Oceania and Australia's geo-strategic regional area, has caused a serious setback to traditional US hegemonic positions.

War Secretary Hegseth, for example, recently addressed a regional defence and security summit with the announcement that 'stronger alliances, greater burden-sharing and a shift away from dependence on the US', were to become the order of the day. (2) The US, however, continue to take the line that peace is established through military strength. (3)

The moves follow already established acknowledgement that the US is no longer the dominant power in the Pacific. In fact, a US Congressional committee revealed those findings nearly a decade ago; it also included reference to the Pentagon making greater use of both Australia and Japan as regional hubs for 'US interests'. (4)

It should, therefore, come as no great surprise to find moves by the Pentagon to draw Australia into the position of a 'central node' alongside the US; it marks a shift away from the traditional 'hubs and spokes' type defence and security provision toward a 'multi-node web' with the US in position at the centre. (5)

And recent high-level diplomatic meetings between Australia and Japan appear to follow the new US regional upgrades to existing defence and security provision. A diplomatic statement issued by the Japanese Ambassador to Canberra, Kazuhiro Suzuki, noted that the recent visit to Australia by PM Sanae Takaichi, aimed to 'forge an unprecedented level of solidarity and strategic co-operation'. (6)

Indonesia and Australia involved

Indonesia also has an upgraded role, alongside Australia and the US. A report in Breaking Denece (see note 1) talks of “the emerging amphibious partnership among the US, Australia, and Indonesia”. 

“The Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement and the expansion of Exercise Keris Woomera are formally a bilateral story. But that framing leaves out the unspoken third leg of the triangle.

“The United States Marine Corps is woven through nearly every aspect of what Australia brings to the littoral. Marine Rotational Force–Darwin has made northern Australia a sustained laboratory for US and Australian experimentation in Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, stand-in forces, land-based anti-ship fires, and the logistics of dispersing small lethal units across austere island locations. The November 2024 amphibious landing at Banongan Beach in East Java, the largest and most complex joint drill Australia and Indonesia had ever conducted, carried that intellectual and operational DNA directly into a bilateral framework where no American flag appeared on the beach.”

Camel train

As an example of the projected dispersal of forces, Breaking Defense cites the Australian “camel train project” which uses drones to carry out supply chain tasks in northern Australia.  

“The problem is operationally straightforward: Australia has only a handful of permanently manned air bases, all of which would be priority targets in a high-intensity conflict. Camel Train addresses this by turning general aviation itself into a defense asset,”

No doubt influenced by the successful use of drones in the war to resist Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the article says that “Australia has approximately 30,000 licensed drone operators certified under CASA standards; in a mobilization phase, this represents a potential operational reserve that has never existed before in this form.”

New role for “lower-level partners”

Announcements about wider scale military inter-operability and the significance of the AUKUS agreements have to be viewed in that light. The US will maintain its control of existing military agreements although it will increasingly rely upon US allies to take front-line diplomatic and military positions, as directed by the Pentagon.

What the Pentagon appears to have also begun is a systematic upgrade to their IPS, by using former lower-level partners as hubs for future regional deployments and the siting of military facilities at short notice. While the main IPS, for example, uses the 'Quad' to contain and encircle China, lower-level partners, including the ROK, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam and others in the South Pacific, are now regarded as strategic attachments to the main military body. (7) They are now set for enhanced use, and operations, by the Pentagon.

A recent statement from Canberra about the defence and security of Australian military bases also contained fears that China may have the potential to use their advanced satellite imaging to threaten military facilities in the Northern Territories  'with a long-range strike'. (8) A recent military operation, for example, relocated important facilities 'to safer locations … it was … taken to rehearse counter-strike operations had this occurred due to conflict'. (9) It was noted in military communiques that 'within 24 hours we'd flushed the base, repositioned the assets', and then conducted a lengthy air-born operation involving flights of 2,400 nautical miles in a 'maritime strike mission'. (10) South China Seas?

In conclusion, the moves can only endanger individual countries across the Indo-Pacific region by drawing them closer to likely military hostilities between the US and China:

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     The new Indo-Pacific security architecture, Breaking Defence, 18 May 2026.
2.     Pentagon chief Hegseth, Gulf News, 30 May 2026; and, 'US not retreating, its remaking world,   Australian, 1 June 2026.
3.     Ibid.
4.     Study: US no longer the dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
5.     Breaking Defence, op.cit., 18 May 2026.
6.     See: Takaichi's visit strategic more than ceremonial, Australian, 15 May 2026.
7.     See: The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
8.     Making our bases harder nuts to crack, Indian Ocean Defence and Security Supplement, Australian, 26 May 2026.
9.     Ibid.
10.   Ibid.

How US imperialism is shaping Australia’s regional approaches

 Written by: (Contributed) on 31 May 2022

Within hours of the Australian Labor Party winning recent federal elections the Biden presidential administration presented Australia with a major diplomatic challenge, potentially escalating regional diplomatic tensions with China. The endorsement of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) regional bloc the same weekend has also presented Canberra with an alternative trade organisation to accommodate. The US has already clearly set the agendas for what they expect a compliant Australian government to follow. References to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) diplomatic meeting hosted by Japan, two days later, has also presented the incoming ALP federal government with a massive US-created agenda spanning issues usually associated with defence and security provision and economic considerations for 'US interests'

Before the celebrations of the ALP federal election victory had even died away, the US issued the incoming administration of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese with an ultimatum; their support was required for US-led regional planning. The attendance of Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong was required for the 'Quad' summit hosted by Japan, billed as the new 'US-led Asia-Pacific economic bloc aimed at countering Chinese regional dominance'. (1)

The high-level diplomatic meeting, which included the US, India, Japan and 'key regional partners in the 13-member economic alliance', took place, seemingly, in a cordial manner. (2) Behind the scenes, however, it was accompanied by the IPEF endorsement, consolidating 'the Biden administration's most ambitious attempt to build economic ties with Asian nations'. (3) The move, an attempt to reassert traditional US hegemonic positions following the legacy of the Trump administration and their foreign policy blunders, was noted by a White House spokesperson for a policy which 'collectively represented about forty per cent of global GDP'. (4) The Australian component in the new move would appear to be a $470 million foreign aid partnership and a new special envoy for the region 'in addition to a $525 million plan to boost ties with Pacific countries', together with other responsibilities. (5)

It was, therefore, not surprising to find the Quad meeting had a distinct focus upon the South Pacific nations. (6)

The moves, however, have to be seen in the context of other considerations, which have far-reaching implications for the Biden administration and their regional allies. While Biden has waxed lyrical about resetting strong diplomatic links with the ASEAN regional trade body, many of the organisation’s members are apprehensive; they, 'have made it clear they do not want to take sides in the escalating power fight between Beijing and Washington'. (7)

The ASEAN leadership, likewise, has taken steps for over a decade to directly distance the organisation from controversy toward successive US presidential administrations. In 2011, for example, the initial plan for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), was conceived at the ASEAN Summit. Negotiations began the following year at the later ASEAN Summit, which included Australia, New Zealand, Japan and China; India was not included. Following years of preparation, the RCEP was finally established in January, 2022, following the signing of official documentation by fifteen member countries in the Asia-Pacific region; it has been noted it is the largest trade bloc in history. (8)

It was soon noted by representatives of the Biden administration that they regarded the RCEP as 'Chinese dominated'. (9) The sense of urgency by the Biden administration toward countering the RCEP during the past five months formed a conspicuous part of their Cold War regional diplomacy. Those countries associated with the RCEP, furthermore, have taken a position of diplomatic silence, presumably as they have no wish to be seen to take a hostile line toward the US.

Throughout the high-level diplomatic talks in late May the Biden administration placed great emphasis upon Taiwan, which they have assessed as under threat from China. In recent years the US has escalated arms sales to the small island regarded by China as merely a renegade province. It has also been noted the US diplomatic position toward Taiwan has included 'letting US officials meet openly with counterparts and pressing the island's inclusion in international organisations'. (10) The fact the US relies upon Taiwan for an estimated 92 per cent of its most advanced semi-conductors was, nevertheless, played down; 'US interests', remain an important consideration.

The moves also took place in conjunction with calls from the UK to expand NATO provision 'to become more active in confronting Chinese expansionism in the Asia-Pacific'. (11) A number of strategically-placed countries across the wider region remain members of the British Commonwealth. The right-wing Johnson government in the UK has already provided an outline of a new 'global NATO … to expand its reach to boost Indo-Pacific security', although to what extent these sabre-rattling moves have been specifically designed to deflect attention away from Johnson's sex-life and after-hours drinking patterns, has yet to be established. (12) He is a man with considerable baggage, of which he has no intention of discussing or even acknowledging openly.

While the so-called western alliance relies upon frantic 'fiddling' and crying 'wolf', China's economy continues to grow; it presents a formidable challenge to US-led hegemony. Serious commentary about the under-lying economic factors surrounding these US-led defence and security initiatives, for example, have already noted 'all western nations increasingly resemble the chronic debt and deficit economies of Western Europe. Long term, those economies are sclerotic and stagnant, and so are their societies'. (13) It has also been noted global debt, as a percentage of GDP, has already risen from 269 per cent to 348 per cent since the global financial crisis over a decade ago. (14) Throughout the recent US-led high-level diplomatic talks there was no reference to Australia even considering an independent foreign policy as a precaution against being drawn into problems not of their own making; perhaps, however, the matter should now be placed firmly on future agendas, before real-war scenarios actually take place in the Indo-Pacific region.

1.     Albanese signs up to new US-Asia alliance, Australian, 24 May 2022.
2.     Ibid.
3.     Biden deepens US-Asia links, Australian, 24 May 2022.
4.     Ibid.
5.     Albanese signs, op.cit., Australian, 24 May 2022.
6.     See: Albanese's day one: change the climate, Australian, 25 May 2022.
7.     Biden pledges funds to reset ASEAN ties, The Weekend Australian, 14-15 May 2022.
8.     See: Wikipedia – The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
9.     Biden hits China with Asia-Pacific bloc tackle, Australian, 24 May 2022.
10.   Biden sticks to policy on Taiwan, Australian, 25 May 2022.
11.   Strategic partnerships crucial, Editorial, the Weekend Australian, 21-22 May 2022, which has included a high-level diplomatic statement from UK Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss.
12.   UK push for 'a new global NATO', Australian, 29 April 2022.
13.   Strategic partnerships crucial, op.cit., Weekend Australian, 21-22 May 2022.
14.   Challenges for Albanese, Australian, 25 May 2022.

US war preparations: push for NATO to expand into Indo-Pacific region

 Written by: (Contributed) on 2 July 2021

US-led moves to expand NATO into the Indo-Pacific region to counter China has raised serious questions about the future designated role of Australia. 

If Australia was used to host expanded NATO facilities the country would be placed in the front-line of US-led regional military and security provision and become a large-scale player in a future war with China.

Throughout June a flurry of media releases surrounding the recent high-level diplomatic meetings of the G7 and NATO publicised US military planning to step-up regional military and security provision in the Indo-Pacific. 

A number of official media releases actually advocated US-led plans to transform NATO 'from a European to a global security collaboration', with specific interest in the Indo-Pacific. (1) It was noted that 'NATO would bring an established defence network and command structure to Asia, decades of operational experience and military capacity', leaving little to the imagination about future planning for real-war scenarios. (2)

The statements coincided with two further additional media releases from the Australian Defence Department that a war with China was possible and Australia was planning to increase the US troop presence in the Northern Territory. (3)

A statement from the US diplomatic services also high-lighted that 'pre-positioning of US weapons in Australia offered strategic advantages … and that … it just makes sense to forward deploy US war stocks in Australia', drawing Australia ever closer to US-led regional military planning. (4)

In recent times there has also been a dramatic increase in western military activity in the Indo-Pacific. While most European countries have historically had involvement in US-led regional military exercises, from a standpoint of being previous colonial powers and possessing present-day neo-colonial ambitions, the Indo-Pacific has always been regarded differently. The region is vast and composed of thousands of small islands: 'policing' type action has been extremely difficult. The many smaller island countries have historically, nevertheless, existed under US-led tutelage and relied upon Australia and Japan as major regional hubs for 'US interests' although geographical distances remain problematic with their involvement in military and security provision.

Faced with the rapid rise of China, however, the US appears to be now panicking as their traditional hegemonic position across the vast region has entered into competition with China. In fact, as early as 2018, a US Congressional Commission found 'the US is no longer clearly superior to the threats it faces around the world and that it would struggle to win wars against China or Russia'. (5)  

At the recent G7 summit a separate trilateral meeting took place between US President Biden, British PM Boris Johnson and Australian PM Scott Morrison, who subsequently issued an official diplomatic statement that they had 'discussed a number of mutual concerns, including the Indo-Pacific region'. (6)

The three countries form part of the elite 5-Eyes intelligence-sharing network; a major player inside NATO, with nineteen members of the 54 British Commonwealth countries in Asia and the Pacific. It is, therefore, hardly surprising to find the three countries agreed 'that the strategic context in the Indo-Pacific was changing and that there was a strong rationale for deepening co-operation between the three governments'. (7)

The move would appear set to counter geo-strategic problems experienced by the US in the region: many countries with strong relations with China have been reluctant to take sides between the US and China; they have too much to lose. The US has, therefore, been confronted with a credible challenge to their existing military and other agreements and alliances.

Expanding NATO would appear the favoured realistic option for the US, Britain and Australia; they appear set to foist the European-based structure upon the Indo-Pacific in due course, as a fall-back position to already existing US-led military and security provision.

Two further factors have to be taken into consideration.

A recent defence publication announced Australia was in a prime position as part of the US present global force posture review to work even more closely with the Pentagon and that discussions had already taken place about considering the establishment of a new US fleet headquarters in the Indian Ocean, with the specific reference to siting the facility at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. It was, furthermore, noted that 'while the South Pacific will remain vital to Australia's national security … the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia far out-rank the South Pacific in every key measure of importance'. (8)

The announcement coincided with a report from a leading Canberra government advisory organisation, the Lowy Institute, that 'Australia is well positioned to become a crucial hub for an enlarged NATO'. (9) The matter would also appear to have been discussed in Canberra as it was officially acknowledged that the Morrison government have 'enthusiastically endorsed' such a proposal. (10)

The announcement that Australia had officially joined the US Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS), based with the US 6th Fleet in Naples, Italy, which in turn, is part of NATO Forces Europe, would appear to signify Australia had established near real-time communications inside NATO. While ostensibly concerned with monitoring and tracking suspicious maritime vessels, the MSSIS is a sophisticated signals satellite facility linking 75 countries with the US military. (11)

In conclusion, moves appear well under-way to expand NATO into the Indo-Pacific region with active support from the present Morrison Coalition government: Australia has been drawn even closer to Pentagon regional military planning as a target and as an active participant for real-war scenarios across the wider region should they take place.

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!

 

1.     Crucial hub for NATO in Asia, Australian, 15 June 2021; and, Forget narrative of decline, this hostile bear still has teeth, Australian, 15 June 2021.
2.     Ibid, Crucial hub for NATO, Australian, 15 June 2021.
3.     'We must get real on possible China war', Australian, 26 April 2021; and, Dutton wants to lift number of US marines, Australian, 11 June 2021.
4.     US eyes Top End military build-up to combat China threat, Australian, 26 May 2021.
5.     Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Paul D. Shinkman, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
6.     Military exercises 'will turn down the heat', The Weekend Australian, 19-20 June 2021.
7.     Ibid.
8.     Minister must drive force posture review, WA Defence Supplement, The Weekend Australian, 22-23 May 2021.  
9.     Crucial hub, op.cit., Australian, 15 June 2021.
10.   Ibid.
11.   US satellite deal boosts border security, Australian, 29 June 2021.

Changing Balance of Forces Between Rival Imperialisms in Our Region

 Written by: (Contributed) on 7 May 2021

Understanding the minds behind military planning invariably includes their ability to identify adversaries, to conduct comparisons between military powers and their assessments of the prevailing balance of forces.

A recent statement from a retired US military hawk, providing reference to all three criteria is, therefore, an addition to our understanding of the changing balance of forces for the US, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, when compared to other similar assessments.

In light of the recently announced upgrades to four key military bases in the Northern Territory in Australia, the assessment has provided a rather different picture to the one given by the Morrison coalition government in Canberra.

A number of other related factors also give serious cause for alarm.

In late April, the Australian published a feature-spread by Seth Cropsey, a former deputy under-secretary for the US navy during the Reagan and Bush administrations, which was a central position in the Pentagon. The retired military hawk was allowed 45 column centimetres to push an argument which effectively challenged the political line of the Australian government. (1)

Rapid air deployments or a battle of the navies?

Coming the day after the Morrison coalition government formally announced planned upgrades to four key military facilities in the north of the country, the Cropsey article suggested any forthcoming hostilities between the US and China 'would be a naval one', and be primarily concerned with denying China's 'use of shipping lanes between it and the Middle East, and operate effectively to command the South China Seas, East China and Yellow Seas'. (2)

The position taken by the present Australian government would appear primarily focussed upon rapid air deployments to regional trouble-spots to challenge China. (3) Forming part of a $270 billion defence spending spree, announcements that they were intended 'to ensure the ADF can respond to emerging challenges', appeared more along the lines of political spin than a sensible discourse. (4)

The differences of military opinion reflect widespread concern in the Pentagon about the changing balance of forces across the Indo-Pacific region and China's credible challenge to traditional hegemonic positions.

It follows a US congressional report published in November 2018, that 'the US is no longer clearly superior to the threats it faces around the world and that it would struggle to win wars against China and Russia', revealing a changing balance of forces. (5)

Further concerns, by Jim Molan, former chief of operations for coalition forces in Iraq and now a right-wing Senator in NSW, likewise warned 'the sombre reality that war is not just possible in our region, but likely', together with a timespan of between 3-5 years before hostilities begin, has provided a chilling assessment of what Australians are likely to expect in due course. (6) He also concluded his recent assessment with the statement, 'an honest assessment of the ADF, even with its additional $270 billion investment over 10 years, reveals it might be able to win one or two battles, but not run a campaign, win a war, or defend Australia'. (7)

The Cropsey article, furthermore, provided an elaborate analysis and comparison of military power: while pushing a naval military perspective, he stated the US, at present, has 101 ships deployed around the world. The entire US fleet is 297 strong, as compared with nearly 600 in the period of the Reagan presidency. He concluded 'the fleet doesn't have enough ships to meet global commitments', and, 'the Chinese navy would be a formidable foe'. (8)

At no time, however, have military planners delved more deeply into the rising competition taking place across the Indo-Pacific region to consider causal factors of the present diplomatic tensions between the US and China: 'US interests', while based in economic reasoning, also include defence and security considerations; China's, by contrast, are usually solely economic-based. Beijing has been able to build strong diplomatic links across the region through favourable trade and skilful diplomacy while the US has become more concerned with swashbuckling military-style bravado and preconceptions of 'US interests'.

With large numbers of US military personnel already based in facilities in Australia in preparation for the Operation Talisman Sabre war-games scheduled for August, a sensible observer might ask what type of diplomatic message is being conveyed toward countries in the Indo-Pacific region with extensive joint training together with 'security operations and high-end live-fire exercises' having already been planned. (9)

Nearly a decade ago a statement from the Pentagon included reference to the military centre of US operations 'walking a fine line' where their goal was to 'reassure its anxious regional allies' about foreign policy. (10) They acknowledged that while many countries wanted to retain US support, they also 'did not want to provoke China, and they aren't sure Washington, given its fiscal constraints, can counter Beijing's rapid military modernisation'. (11) That was, however, a regional diplomatic assessment from a previous period.  

US imperialism pushing "allies" to do more of its work

Today, US-led regional foreign policy is more concerned with directing allies to take sides, with a massive wave of militarisation taking place. The US is clearly preparing for real-war scenarios, through their allies including Australia. It is not difficult to establish the scale of the wave of militarisation taking place: the ADF are currently replacing 59 Abrams M1A1 Battle Tanks and buying 160 additional ones together with four Chinook helicopters from the US at a total of $2.5 billion. They have been noted as providing a 'unique armour package', although no further details have been released by the Defence Department. (12)

It is not particularly difficult to point the finger of blame: a sensible analysis might well conclude that as China has successfully dislodged 'US interests' across the Indo-Pacific region, it is hardly likely to want to fight a war which will interfere, if not destroy, its favourable trade and diplomatic relations.

The recent military assessments have shown the US to have become increasingly desperate as it confronts China in an economic challenge which it cannot automatically win. In fact, it may well have already lost. The likelihood of real-war scenarios has, therefore, become a very realistic possibility as they seek to reassert traditional hegemonic positions:

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     America's naval strategy all at sea on China, Australian, 29 April 2021.
2.     Ibid.
3.     Let the war games begin, Australian, 28 April 2021.
4.     Ibid.
5.     Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Paul D. Shinkman, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
6.     Complacency an enemy as reality of conflict sets in, Australian, 3 May 2021.
7.     Ibid.
8.     Australian, op.cit., 29 April 2021.
9.     Australian, op.cit., 28 April 2021.
10.   US seeks new Asia defences, The Wall Street Journal, 24-26 August 2012.
11.   Ibid.
12.   $2.5 bn for US tanks and choppers, Australian, 4 May 2021.

Interoperability and US military planning for the Indo-Pacific

 Written by: (Contributed) on 18 December 2020

Australian government decision-makers involved with a defence contract for acquisition of helicopters have revealed the central importance of inter-operability for the Pentagon and their use for rapid deployments with regional military operations.

Together with compatibility of sensitive military equipment, the US has increasingly relied upon its two regional hubs, Australia and Japan, for military and security provision aligned with 'US interests'.

Both hubs have, subsequently, been pushed into front-line positions by US regional foreign policy, with conventional military considerations and softer-style diplomacy both having the same aim of reasserting traditional hegemonic positions.

The position is fraught with dangers as rising diplomatic tensions could easily escalate into real war scenarios.

Three former members of the Australian Defence Forces now sitting as M.P.s in Canberra have lodged a suggestion that the European-designed ARH Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter in present use should be decommissioned in favour of two other US-manufactured systems. (1) The three, Liberal M.P.s Andrew Hastie and Phillip Thomson together with ALP M.P. Luke Gosling, apparently favour the Boeing-manufactured Apache AH64E or the Bell-manufactured AH-17 Viper systems.

The reasoning behind the decision has ostensibly been due to the ARH Tiger being plagued with problems and a flight-cost of $34,000 per hour. While the helicopter is no longer in production, which has raised problems of on-going maintenance and spare parts, cost has never really been an issue in defence circles. They tend to be big spenders: the defence department does not usually conduct its business on the basis of cost-effectiveness or chasing special offers.

Other factors, therefore, would appear to have been considered with the decision-making.
The Apache and Viper technical specifications note they are 'fully integrated with Australian and US weapons systems'; as the Pentagon has undergone moves to upgrade military equipment and ensure compatibility for real-war scenarios, inter-operability has become a key jargon word. (2)

Last year, official Pentagon media releases included reference to the strategic significance of military facilities in Australia's northern areas. (3) It was noted that 'Australia's Top End air bases were seen as a valuable strategic asset by the US in its military planning'. (4) The country is a southern regional hub for 'US interests' with Japan as a northern counterpart. Much of the US-led military planning toward the two hubs is remarkably similar; both countries have been pushed into front-line positions for regional operations.

The recent high-level diplomatic talks between Australia and Japan, for example, noted both countries were 'strategic partners and work closely together on trade, security, defence'. (5)

The use, by US military personnel, of Australian and Japanese facilities is not for logistics, storage and training; it is a vital part of US-led military planning for regional operations. Following the recent high-level diplomatic talks between Australia and Japan an official media release noted 'our defence forces can … now … operate in and around Japan and Japanese self-defence forces can operate in and around Australia … this new agreement is driven by Australia-Japan strategic concord'. (6)

The US-led military planning has drawn both hubs ever closer to real-war scenarios where an official media release noted Canberra had already entered 'grey zone operations just below the level of open conflict' in the region. (7)   

Reference, therefore, to the recent Canberra defence talks and a suggestion the Viper was 'ready made for engagements across our sprawling archipelagic region made up of thousands of islands with a lot of ocean between them', together and that the 'the Viper would be interoperable with those flown by US Marines in Darwin', leave little to the imagination about US-led military planning for the wider region. (8)

The moves have been accompanied by two further considerations: a recent US-led military exercise, and the use of softer-style US-led regional diplomacy thrust upon Australia.

The recent US-led Noble Fury military exercise included training provision for the capturing of remote islands and atolls which form part of strategic chains of small landmasses with the use of guerrilla-style tactics. The 'expeditionary advanced base operations' were planned for strategic areas and included rapid deployment for US-led personnel to move quickly between strategic targets on the basis of 'shoot and scoot'. (9)  

In recent times US-led regional military planning has focussed upon Island Chain Theory for demarcation and defence and security provision. It is aimed at containing and encircling China's influence across the region by restricting their access and egress.

It is, therefore, important to note the recent Noble Fury exercise is expected to be fully operational at the start of the next decade, with helicopter provision being a central part of the military planning. (10) US-led military planning will increasingly focus upon strengthening strategic island chains; the proposed acquisition of either the Apache or Viper helicopters has coincided with other US-led military plans, inter-operability is regarded as essential.

Secondly, a recent reference made by outgoing US ambassador to Australia, Arthur Culvahouse, that, 'America … wants … to reassert its role in key multilateral bodies … in co-operation with countries such as Australia', has revealed greater diplomatic responsibilities have been placed upon Australia by the US. (11) It has placed Australia in a difficult position, with both military and diplomatic considerations; similar responsibilities have also been thrust upon Japan.

                                           We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     MPs want US chopper to replace 'disastrous' Tiger, Australian, 14 December 2020.
2.     Ibid.
3.     Strategic alliance in north enthuses visiting US chiefs, Australian, 22 August 2019.
4.     PM to meet Japan's Suga on home soil, Australian, 13 November 2020.
5.     Australian, op.cit., 22 August 2019.
6.     Trip emphasis that we and Japan are natural partners, Australian, 18 November 2019.
7.     The alliance is safe, The Weekend Australian, 14-15 November 2020.
8.     Australian, op.cit., 14 December 2020.
9.     US marines move fast to 'shoot and scoot', Australian, 22 October 2020.
10.   Ibid.
11.   Washington has work to do whoever wins, says envoy, Australian, 14 November 2020.

The Defence Strategic Update – defending US imperialism

Written by: (Contributed) on 8 July 2020

The recent announcement from the Morrison coalition government about the Defence Strategic Update 2020 (DSU) has little to do with Australian defence and security considerations; it is primarily concerned with strengthening the so-called 'alliance' and 'US interests' with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

The developments have also taken place within the context of rising US-led diplomatic tensions toward China.

Morrison's announcement of an increased $270 billion Australian defence budget for the next decade was couched in political duplicity and jargonised terminology; it included flowery statements including that it 'embraces a new strategic agenda based on hi-tech force projection for Australia' together with other trivia. (1) It was timed to coincide with Pentagon military planning in what may well be the dying months of the Trump administration; US-led military hawks want to strengthen and consolidate their present Cold War position before a likely change of presidency.

 

The so-called DSU, therefore, is primarily concerned with the military alliance with the US and 'US interests' in a region where the rise of China has been assessed as altering the traditional balance of forces and hegemonic positions.

 

US military planning uses Australia as a regional hub for operations in the southern part of the region, with Japan as a northern counterpart. Military planning based on the DSU defines the north-east Indian Ocean, south-east Asia and the south-west Pacific as 'the core of Australian strategic thinking for decades'. Readers of the defence department releases are denied specific important facts to hide the role of the US. (2)

 

In early 1973, for example, the then South African Apartheid government of Prime Minister Vorster opened a Maritime Operational Communications Headquarters at Silvermine, near Cape Town. (3) A few weeks later the US opened similar intelligence facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, which were subsequently linked to Pine Gap, central Australia. (4) The system was then linked to similar facilities in Argentina for US-led surveillance of the southern oceans. All four strategic hubs are situated on the same distances, using an actual size world map, revealing compatibility of signals transmission and reception facilities.

 

The US used Australia to host the Pine Gap facilities due to its relative political stability and strategic position, with strong diplomatic links with the neighbouring region. It is, therefore, hardly surprising to note the areas of the Indo-Pacific regarded as the 'Australian Defence Force geographical focus' all exist on the same arc from Pine Gap using an actual size world map. It is, furthermore, important to note the emphasis placed upon electronic warfare provision and other advanced intelligence-based facilities in the DSU budget, for the 'first objective … to shape Australia's strategic environment'. (5)

The DSU budget, for example, has included the expansion of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, based at Longreach, Queensland, to provide greater wide area surveillance of 'Australia's eastern approaches'. (6) No reference, however, was provided about Island Chain Theory, the revamped vogue military strategist standpoint where Australia forms part of the main third chain and the defence and security of eastern coastlines are regarded as potentially vulnerable. (see diagram above). The theory was largely discredited in the previous Cold War, although the Trump administration has little time for historical precedents.

It is also interesting to note the political duplicity used with official media releases; what has been omitted is far more revealing of Pentagon mindsets. One release about the Australian regional role with US-led military planning, for example, stated 'significantly, the priority zone does not include north-east Asia'. (7) North-east Asia, however, does not form part of Canberra's area of designated interest as shown by the arc from Pine Gap. Other US-led intelligence facilities based in Japan are used for the surveillance of the northern part of the region.

US military hawks are quite clearly planning for real-war scenarios and have already issued media releases headlined with 'Australia must be up for conventional war'. (8) And with the Pentagon pulling the strings and their puppets jumping to attention in Canberra,  we need an independent foreign policy!

                                     
1.     Our best defence is a good offence, The Weekend Australian, 4-5 July 2020.

2.     Money must flow if we're muscling up, Australian, 2 July 2020.

3.     Maritime Operational and Communications HQ, The Star (South Africa), 10 March 1973; and, Security in the Mountain, The Star (South Africa), 17 March 1973; see also, The Falcon and the Snowman, Robert Lindsay, ((New York, 1979).

4.     Wikipedia: Diego Garcia.

5.     Morrison shoulders arms to Beijing, Australian, 1 July 2020.

6.     Air, Total Spending, $65 billion – Main New Initiatives, Australian, 2 July 2020.

7.     Weekend Australian, op.cit., 4-5 July 2020.    

8.     Australia must be up for conventional war, Australian, 2 July 2020.