Written by: (Contributed) on 10 June 2026
(Above: Royal Australian air force Wing Commander Tanya Evans, RAAF No. 23 Squadron commanding officer, left, speaks with U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Bolton, Eighteenth Air Force commander, right, during an immersion at RAAF Base Amberley, Australia, Dec. 9, 2025. The immersion was part of a welcome briefing for the players participating in Operation KENNEY STRIKES BACK, a joint and coalition exercise designed by the 62d Airlift Wing to validate rapid generation and power projection capabilities, while operating effectively with joint, allied, and partner forces. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Blake Gonzales. Public domain)
Scrutiny of Australia's defence budget following demands by the Trump administration to increase expenditure has provided some interesting insights into the mindsets of the higher echelons of decision-makers in Canberra. It has also thrown light upon Australia's designated role to 'project power' in support of sensitive US defence and security provision in the Indian Ocean. All is not what it would appear.
A study of the Australian defence budget has revealed allocations into sensitive areas of the Canberra bureaucracy not usually associated with the military. The fact that what was diplomatically noted as 'large slices of funding for ASIO, ASIS, the Department of Home Affairs, the Office of National Intelligence, and the national intelligence watch-dog, the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security', have remained comparatively well hidden in vast troves of government bureaucracy. (1) Secrecy can be used to serve many purposes.
The findings have to be seen in the light of recent demands by the Trump administration for Australia to increase its defence budget to 3.5 per cent of GDP 'as soon as possible'. (2)
During the days of the immediate aftermath of the previous Cold War, Australia's defence budget fell to about 1.75 per cent of GDP; previously it had been above 2.5 per cent of GDP.
(3) Only in 2013 did the defence budget increase to about two per cent of GDP, hovering between 1.9 per cent and 2.1 per cent of GDP. (4) For the next Australian financial year the budget actually falls back to 2.02 per cent of GDP. (5)
Defence budget projections have recently concluded that Canberra's use of its present accounting methods show the present budget will increase to about 2.5 per cent by the mid-2030s. (6)
The budget percentages, however, have been disputed by various government officials on the basis of what actually constitutes a defence allocation. The fact that Canberra uses part of its defence budget to finance the intelligence services perhaps reveals a great deal about the present Cold War mind-set in both domestic and foreign monitoring and surveillance.
Just who is spying on whom? And for what reason? Immigration? Emigration?
The debate has taken place amid concerns that China, for example, has already established a credible foothold across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The US, in response, has begun upgrading its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), making greater use of Australia for the defence and security of 'US interests'. References in military publications have included, 'enhancing its northern and north-western bases to support force projection into the region'. (7)
Reference to force projection, however, is misleading. It is not merely restricted to the range and capacity of missiles being launched into Australia's neighbouring region. It is, primarily, the role of the intelligence services to assessments developments and to analyse their significance. It should be noted, for example, that the 'Pentagon has a vast bureaucracy devoted to gathering and analysing intelligence'; the use of sensitive signals-intelligence (SIGINT), however, rests upon 'ground humans', who are well-placed agents (HUMINT) trusted with providing sensitive and secret intelligence in their localities. (8)
References in recent military publications about Australia's role in the Indian Ocean have provided an interesting insight into the close links between US-led intelligence facilities and their counterparts in Australia. A significant part of the US upgrading to their Indo-Pacific Strategy has included expanding the three tier Island Chain Theory across the Asia-Pacific region into fourth and fifth chains across the Indian Ocean, with specific reference to Diego Garcia as a main intelligence-gathering facility closely linked to Pine Gap.
It has been noted, for example, that 'Australia identifies the north-east Indian Ocean, alongside the South Pacific and South-east Asia, as one of its strategic priority areas'. (9) The high-level diplomatic statement was accompanied by a list of countries in the Indian Ocean regarded as geo-strategically important being drawn closer to Australia for the specific purpose of establishing 'mechanisms for the sharing of information and intelligence'. (10)
And the implementation of the grande plan would appear already under-way, if the facts and figures in the defence budget are correct. Breaking down the budget into individual areas of significance for the plan include Australian Signals Directorate, which specialises in SIGINT. A marked increase in their recent budget allocation has been recorded as:
2025-26 – 2331 ($m)
2026-27 – 2531
2027-28 – 2382
2028-29 – 2266 (11)
Their intelligence counterparts, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, likewise, have a recorded recently increased budget allocation of:
2025-26 – 524 ($m)
2026-27 – 549
2027-28 – 522
2028-29 – 503 (12)
When incoming US ambassador, Dr. David Brat, stated at a recent high-level diplomatic mission in Canberra that, 'he loved everything about Australia … and that … few countries were more important to US interests than Australia and he expected the alliance relationship to deepen over time', he left little to the imagination. (13) It was to be expected.
A statement from Brat's counterpart, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, James Risch, likewise, included the statement that 'Dr. Brat would be charged with overseeing an historic transformation of our alliance with Australia as the US moved to step up diplomatic economic and security co-operation through AUKUS and other initiatives'. (14)
Studies of sensitive information can often clarify and highlight seemingly hidden insights:
We need an independent foreign policy!
1. Sexy little numbers that conceal our modesty, Australian, 2 June 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Questions cloud big-spending ambitions for national strategy, Defence Report, Australian, 2 June 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. 'We must be more self-reliant', Australian, 2 June 2026.
7. Making our bases harder nuts to crack, Indian Ocean Defence and Security Supplement, Australian, 26 May 2026.
8. See: Pentagon's parallel spy network revealed, The Guardian Weekly (U.K.), 28 January – 3 February 2005.
9. New wave of diplomacy creates a secure Indian ocean for all, Indian Ocean Defence and Security Supplement, Australian, 26 May 2026.
10. Ibid.
11. 'We must be more self-reliant', Australian, op.cit., 2 June 2026.
12. Ibid.
13. Envoy's focus on Pacific security, Australian, 22 May 2026.
14. Ibid.






