The Henderson warfare target

 Written by: Nick G. on 27 August 2026

 

The Australian government earlier this week released its plans for the Henderson Defence Precinct in Western Australia.

Last September, the government announced a $12 billion downpayment on the facility that will include naval shipyards and AUKUS-related programs, with an estimated total cost of around $25 billion over the next decade.

US Empire agent of influence and Defence Minister Richard Marles said at the time that the investment was “really important in terms of getting more of our allied submarines into the water, more sea days,” adding “And this is exactly what America wants.”

And doing exactly what the Americans want is the self-appointed task of the Albanese-Marles-Wong triumvirate at the head of the Australian government.

A map released with this week’s announcement shows three areas labelled “Nuclear Powered Submarine Sustainment”, “Shipbuilding and Sustainment” and “Fabrication, support and other facilities” respectively. The latter is a civilian, non-defence related industrial area.

The whole precinct is located immediately south of Austal’s existing shipyard and takes in areas currently occupied by BAE Systems Australia, as well as civilian boat yards. 

What the map misses is the overlay of a bull’s eye target.

This was clearly stated to the Fremantle hearing of the Public Inquiry into AUKUS by none other than by Brigadier The Hon Linda Reynolds (Retd), Minister for Defence in the Morrison government from 2019 to 2021. 

Referring to a war of physical weapons, as distinct from an electro-magnetic or cyber war, as “kinetic war”, she told the Inquiry: 

If kinetic war was to break out to our north, here in Australia I believe we would be not only subjected to heighten hybrid attacks, but we would also be subjected to precision kinetic attacks. The joint facilities, bases and airfields across our approaches are already targets and a capable adversary would strike them early. A war that looked northern would not stay in the north.

The bases and assets that keep allied submarines in the fight sit on our western coast, which places this coast on the front line, not behind it.

China pledged during Mao’s socialist era not to be the first to attack, nor to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The same pledge is maintained by the social-imperialists who now control China as to do otherwise would be an open admission of aggressive intent that would damage China’s relations with the international community.

However, if the US imperialists were to launch a pre-emptive strike on China, then China would retaliate, and US bases here in Australia would be among its targets.

So, Reynolds is right – a war with China, provoked by US imperialism, would not be fought in some mythical place called “over there” – it would be fought on Australian soil and include military facilities located in or close to major cities.

US imperialism’s military bases in Australia do not make us safer. They endanger us and the only way to remove them is to break the hold that US imperialism has on our economy, our politicians, our senior bureaucrats and defence personnel.

We must fight to achieve genuine anti-imperialist independence and socialism.

 

US-ROK Freedom Shield and other tensions

Written by: (Contributed) on 26 August 2026

 

The decision by the Trump administration to reduce US involvement with ROK counterparts in annual military exercises is best viewed in the context of recent high-level diplomatic statements issued by Washington. They reveal a great deal: President Trump has shown a lack of diplomatic expertise, exposing the White House to other considerations which include continual dysfunctional behaviour, questionable competence and also possible connivance in a sensitive and controversial area of recent ROK history.

The ROK is a key diplomatic ally of the US in northern Asia, strategically positioned for the defence of Japan doctrine. In fact, there remains little ambiguity in the US regional defence and security provision. Canberra has long acknowledged that 'since the Korean war, the US's key interest in Korea has been the strategic security of Japan'. (1) With the US-Japan alliance being upgraded to a global alliance, the strategic significance of the ROK remains extremely important, particularly in light of the close proximity of the northern DPRK and their alliances with Russia and China. (2)

The ROK also hosts nearly 30,000 US military personnel, many of whom remain long-stay residents and involved in sensitive military and security positions. Their tenure has enabled the US to gain involvement inside the ROK political system for generations; the contentious matter has resulted in a widespread political polarisation inside the country. 

Cold War political tensions continue to run high on the Korean peninsula.

The ever-widening political cleavage in the ROK is based upon the fact and economic reality that closer trade relations with China has drawn the country closer to Beijing's sphere of influence. And, subsequently, closer to the northern DPRK.

Centre-left politics, which include the main trade union movement, favour moves away from the US toward a more independent foreign policy. The presidency of Lee Jae Myung in the Blue House in Seoul, for example, has become increasingly reluctant to be openly involved in US-led anti-China diplomacy; it is not in ROK sovereign interests. They tend to follow the line of continuing to be a US ally, while retaining a strategic co-operative partnership with Beijing, which is mutually beneficial. The centre-right, however, appear willing to accept any dictat from Washington and the Pentagon.

There is little common ground between the two competing sides, which continue to openly drift apart.

The position of the Trump administration would, therefore, appear quite clear. They are reluctant to be seen to openly support the present presidency of Lee Jae Myung and his ruling Democrat Party which was returned to office following an attempted parliamentary coup by previous president Yoon Suk Yeol in December, 2024. The Trump administration does not regard the presidential administration of Lee Jae Myung as being supportive of their Middle East foreign policy. (3) Or, at least, that was what was diplomatically stated by the White House. Questionable statements and policies are continually formulated in the White House, however, with the flourish of a pen; they change direction regularly like the wind.

In fact the exact position of the US toward the attempted parliamentary coup has never been accurately established; it would be almost inconceivable the White House and Pentagon did not know about the planning and implementation by Yoon Suk Yeol to seize power and unleash draconian measures to deal with the opposition. It was a classic Cold War drama, with alleged Fifth Columnists lurking in the shadows of the corridors of power in Seoul and other provincial centres. If the coup had proved successful it would have also served 'US interests', at basic face value. The fact that it failed has revealed a great deal about the changing balance of forces taking place across the ROK.

Much of the significance of the ROK for US foreign policy rests upon its annual Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercises, which involve massive mobilisations across South Korea, including civil defence. It is hugely symbolic. A decision by the Trump administration to 'substantially reduce joint military exercises with South Korea', can, therefore, be regarded as symptomatic of changing considerations. (4) Even an official statement issued by the ROK military noted the decision was considered 'unusual'. (5) The annual war games were cut at the final stages of preparation with only the first phase being used: the defence and security of the ROK against potential DPRK threats. (6) The second phase, running from 24-27 August, was postponed; it was focused upon a joint counter-offensive against the north. (7)
  
The moves, interestingly, have also been accompanied by a diplomatic statement that the US was planning to enhance 'fight tonight readiness, modernising the US-ROK alliance and shaping the security environment in North-east Asia'. (8) The diplomatically polite wording contained no details. It would, therefore, appear a convenient cover for something else.

That statement was also over-shadowed by an earlier diplomatic statement issued a few days beforehand which noted in a terse style that the US was 'seeking … to sustain a balance of power in the region … to secure their interests'. (9) It was accompanied with the matter-of-fact acknowledgement that the region 'is incredibly important, one of the most economic areas of the world. We need to take it seriously on its own terms'. (10)

The statement also included reference to the US not pursuing a foreign policy of fealty, but 'recalibrating … practical things: access, collaboration'. (11) But none would appear to be forthcoming. The US is experiencing difficulties accessing what it seeks0; it is not particularly difficult to assess the main factors of influence taking place.   

A pressing issue confronting the US remains one of the unintended outcomes of their bombing of Iran earlier in the year. The Iranian response was to close the Straits of Hormuz, with far-reaching implications for Asia. Japan, for example, relies on the straits for an estimated 93 per cent of its oil imports, the ROK, relies on 90 per cent. (12) South-east Asia, centred on the highly diplomatically influential ASEAN trade bloc, has also been 'exposed to the current crisis … affecting … 60 per cent of regional oil imports'. (13)

The US turf war with China in the region has hit a major obstacle with its attempt to reassert traditional regional hegemonic positions. China became ASEAN's largest trading partner in 2009, and has continued to dislodge US interests since that time. (14) The fact that China also extends its influential trade links into Iran has only compounded the present problem.

The Trump administration appears, nevertheless, quite desperate to resolve the Iran issue; the Iranians, however, have more to gain from the US strategic blunder to attack their country. They are no strangers to diplomatic intrigue; the Strait will remain closed, indefinitely.

Well-placed diplomatic sources have revealed that 'the White House administration has pressed South Korea and other countries that depend on oil that transits the Straits of Hormuz for months to contribute to its efforts around the waterway'. (15) In fact, the US has diplomatically isolated itself over its foreign policy toward the Middle East; and failed.

Amid the diplomatic impasse well-placed sources in Washington have noted that there was a 'growing belief in Asia and Europe that the US is becoming an unreliable ally'. (16) It would appear based upon a wealth of reliable information and open-source intelligence data.

Moves in Canberra to continue to follow the traditional defence of Japan doctrine, for example, have already taken place with high-level meetings with Japan's defence minister, Shinjiro Koizumi. They seek to retain the status quo: a diplomatic statement noted concerns had been raised about the Trump administration and their recent involvement in the Korean peninsula. (17) An official diplomatic statement from Japan about the issue, moreover, noted, 'co-operation between … Japan … the US and South Korea was critical'. (18)

Meanwhile the Trump administration has continued to follow its Cold War foreign policy position toward the ROK with an official statement issued on their behalf by the influential think-tank the so-called US Studies Centre, that, 'the left in Korea … including some of the current administration in Seoul', remain critical of the US. (19) Even if the position was formulated with intelligence assessments, their relevance would appear questionable. It would appear more likely to cast further light upon possible US connivance and the attempted coup by Yoon Suk Yeol and its obsession with Fifth Columnists and the changing balance of forces away from traditional US hegemonic positions.

The so-called alliance Australia has with the US has become extremely and openly problematic, and also very dangerous: We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     North Korea's behaviour could threaten Australian security, Robyn Lim, ONA / Canberra, Australian, 27 December 2002.
2.     The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
3.     President restricts S Korean war games, Australian, 18 August 2026.
4.     Ibid.
5.     South Korean drills cut short 'at suggestion of the US', Australian, 20 August 2026.
6.     Ibid.
7.     Ibid.
8.     Australian, op.cit., 18 August 2026.
9.     US unveils its 'Art of the Deal' policy for access to South-east Asia, Australian, 14 August 2026.
10.   Ibid.
11.   Ibid.
12.   See: Hormuz crisis, DW., 21 April 2026.
13.   Strait of Hormuz crisis, IEA., 16 June 2026.
14.   Ibid.
15.   Australian, op.cit., 18 August 2026.
16.   Is Trump losing the strategic plot? Editorial, Australian, 19 August 2026, quoting the Wall Street Journal.
17.   Missiles ahead of melons for Japan, Australian, 19 August 2026.
18.   Trump upends S Korean alliance, Australian, 19 August 2026; and, Japan missile pact a good thing, Editorial, The Australian, 21 August 2026.
19.   Australian, ibid., 19 August 2026.

 

Race to colonise the Moon sees more space war planning

 Written by: Nick G. on 26 August 2026

 

US imperialism continues to discuss its plans for warfare in Space.  It proceeds from the assumption that “the future warfighting environment is expanding”, and that the potential for conflict comes “from China’s plans for exploring and exploiting the moon.” 

These are direct quotations from a document released in early August by the US SPACECOM.

The paper, titled Space Warfighting Environment 2040, is the first of three SPACECOM intends to release designed to frame “the future of space operations for the Joint Force.” The second document, called “The Space Futures Series,” will provide “issue-driven analysis” of “emerging challenges and problem sets.” The final document, “The Space Warfighting Concept,” will guide how the joint force and SPACECOM “fight and win in space.”

Race to establish Moon base drives Space-fighting 

Both superpowers are locked in a race to obtain the commercial and military advantage of being first to establish an inhabited base on the Moon.

China had planned to launch its Long March 5 rocket, carrying the Chang’e 7 robotic mission to the Moon’s south pole in search of water ice on August 19, but the growth and northerly movement of Tropical Depression Narra in the Gulf of Tonkin caused a delay of at least a month and possibly longer depending on the tweaking of the calculations required for a successful launch. 

Chang’e 7 will circle the Moon for 90 days to select the best location at its favoured landing site, a permanently illuminated peak next to Shackleton crater at the Moon’s South pole.

In a later article, we will discuss the nature of the competition to secure “first there” advantage between China and the US; it is sufficient now to note that this competition is what is driving the US to hone its space-fighting skills.

US builds command structures for space war

SPACECOM is a US unified combatant command in charge of joint force operations above 100 km (62 miles) in altitude, comprising warfighters from all the military services. The latter combine with SPACECOM in a joint forces command structure.

Serving SPAECOM is a separate command called Space Force, a military service responsible for organizing, training and equipping Guardians to serve under SPACECOM and the other 10 combatant commands. “Guardians” is the name given to those who will do the fighting in Space, just as “sailors” do the fighting on the seas and “pilots” do it in the air.

Space Force released a similar 2040-focused document, called “Future Operating Environment,” by recently retired Chief of Space Operations Chance Saltzman in April. 

Both documents focus on cislunar space, the area between the Earth and the Moon, as a domain of emerging military space competition. 

The SPACECOM document cites manoeuverability, not just in space but also on the ground, as an area requiring attention. That is, assets sent into orbit around the Earth must be bale to break free from their stationary orbital location and be capable of being directed into different locations in cislunar space at speed.

Given that the three components of space war are ground-to-space, space-to-space and space-to-ground, effective space warfare requires manoueverability of land-based assets that communicate with Space.

The US online Breaking Defense website cites the losses suffered by US ground facilities by the Iranians in the current war there as showing “the need to address the vulnerabilities of US satellite ground infrastructure that is based on fixed-site receivers and processing centers.”

The 2040 environment document elaborates: “Static ground nodes, once the norm, will become liabilities. They represent single points of failure that adversaries can attack through cyber intrusion, directed energy, precision fires, or sabotage. In a future where space effects must persist through the first strike, fixed infrastructure will be targeted early and often.”

If the US is anticipating retaliatory attacks following its “first strike” aggression against an adversary’s assets in Space, it would make sense that as much of US satellite ground infrastructure as possible is located outside of the US. 

The Force Posture Agreement easily lends itself to the deployment of manoueverable infrastructure such as the GATR Technologies’ portable antenna which dispenses with a rigid dish with heavy-duty structural support and can be quickly packed into cases that are easy to transport and from which it can be quickly reassembled. These systems have already been purchased by the US military and Air Force and could be placed anywhere in Australia under the FPA.

It is essential for Australia’s future security that the hold of the US imperialists over the Australian state be broken, and now.

That means cancellation of the FPA and withdrawal from involvement with any nation in plans for fighting in the “fifth domain” of Space.

It means genuine anti-imperialist independence, and not just a passive declaration of sovereignty, but a contribution to international struggle to defang the imperialists headed by both superpowers.

 

The forked tongue of US policy on the Asia Pacific

Written by: Nick G. on 21 August 2026

 

 
(The US ruling class has always been duplicitous, as the First Nations discovered.  Wikimedia Commons public domain)

 

The US Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eldridge Colby, yesterday held a virtual media briefing whilst on a visit to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.

Colby said “America’s interests are more engaged than ever in the Indo-Pacific, and that we at the Department of War are concentrated on ensuring those interests are stoutly defended. This means a strong and growing U.S. investment in the region.”

 

He also addressed the renaming of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) back to its previous name of the Pacific Command (PACOM), stressing that it was not seeking to undermine the importance of the Indian Ocean and the South Asian countries. 

 

“The change back to PACOM has multiple reasons, but I think what I would stress here is that the strategic focus of the United States military is really — and consistent with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy — is on the first island chain,” he said.

 

The first island chain refers to the islands and island nations stretching from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula down to Peninsular Malaysia that includes the Kuril Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo.

 

“And so the Pacific element to that is really the focus, the Western Pacific area, obviously stretching into Southeast Asia here. Again, that’s the strategic logic,” he said.

 

In a reference to Australia that will surely sicken many of us, he said “I think one of the things that we’ve been impressed with our close ally — no better ally, Australia — is that Australia really sees things through the lens of collective defense and a strategy of deterrence by denial designed to sustain a balance of power in this key region,” adding that he saw an “alignment in thinking” between Australia and the US. 

 

Declaring that the strategic focus of the US military is on the first island chain is really a declaration that for the US, preparation for war with China is its strategic focus. And he knows enough about his Empire loyalists in the Australian government, armed forces and senior bureaucrats to express confidence in their “alignment in thinking” with that of their masters.

 

Saying one thing but meaning another

 

Colby’s statement seems to run counter to recent pronouncement from the boss of US imperialism, Donald Trump.

 

On his May 2026 meeting with Xi Jinping in China, Trump appeared to back away from endorsing Taiwanese independence, indicating a “four noes” policy on the Taiwan question, clearly signalling that he is unwilling to become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and that he opposes reckless moves toward “Taiwan independence.”

 

Trump’s “four noes” mean "not looking to have somebody go independent," not wanting US troops "to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war," not backing "Taiwan independence," and noncommittal to continued arms sales to the island of Taiwan.

 

And just recently, he has used his Truth Social account to make the following statement on North Korea.  We reproduce it in full:

 

Based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un, of North Korea, I am not happy with the fact that the United States has, long ago, agreed to participate in Joint Military Exercises with South Korea. These exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the United States of America (as usual!), but send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile, to a Country that, as long as Donald J. Trump has been President, has been unthreatening and respectful. Therefore, and based on the fact that it is too late to cancel, I have instructed Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, to substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises! While somewhat unrelated (?), I recently asked the President of South Korea if they would like to join us in the Denuclearization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and they said, “No thanks!” Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP

 

Now, of course, you could trust Trump as far as you could spit from a dry mouth on a hot day, but there do appear to be some inconsistencies between the Colby statement and the words of the President.

 

US imperialism is headed by the President of the US, and Trump has his idiosyncracies. But contradiction exists in all things: the US Department of State has its own agenda, the US military-industrial complex has its own interests, and the "hawks" in the US Congress have their own political stage. Behind all of this is US capital and the corporations, banks and financial entities that own it. Whilst the latter group has its common interests, it also has its sectional interests and rivalries. 

 

All of this means that we must judge US imperialism by what it does and what it is planning to do. 

 

One indicator is last month’s 31-nation Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) wargames. The Department of War proceeded from the assumption that having supply lines stretched over thousands of miles, a future war with China would strain US logistics. So, a major part of RIMPAC for the US was to test whether the military could manufacture key spare parts on demand, even aboard ships at sea through a new, networked approach to 3D printers and other high-tech tools they call distributed advanced manufacturing.

 

What is happening in military exercises is also being enunciated in new policy documents.

 

A new science and technology strategy released this week by the White House outlines a comprehensive, four-tiered priority scheme for military tech, from AI to quantum.

 

At the base of the pyramid are “key enabling technologies” that support three higher-priority techs. These enablers range from advanced manufacturing (e.g. 3D printers) to hypersonics, nuclear energy, and semiconductors.

 

At the top of the pyramid are the “three priority areas for U.S. battlefield dominance and power projection”:

 

• undersea superiority, both for submarines and anti-submarine warfare;

• space, meaning the ability to not just “detect” threats but also “counter” them, from low orbit to the Moon; and

• AI and autonomy, a “rapidly evolving area” which the strategy doesn’t define as clearly as the other two, but which in prior Pentagon usage has meant everything from strategic planning software to swarming drones.

 

In each of these three priority areas, there is concern that the US is falling behind China, hence the preparation for war in the South China Sea and the Pacific tops the list and incorporates the AUKUS arrangements, facilitated by their lackeys here and that “alignment in thinking”.

 

There is no point trying to take Trump at his word. He and the other component parts of the system of US imperialism speak with a forked tongue.

 

Watch their actions, not their words.

Impact of Russian Revolution on Labor Party In Australia

Written by: Ned K. on 20 August 2026

 

I have been reading Weevils In The Flour by Wendy Löwenstein.  The book is an oral record of Australian people of various backgrounds and occupations during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

One of the chapters is about a bookmaker, Harry, in Balmain who talks about the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1917 on the workers’ struggles and hopes in Australia.

Harry recalls a piece from the Australian Worker magazine of October 1921 which read,

“The Australian Labor Party was a respectable parliamentary party committed to reform, not revolt, but the left- wing was strong in the unions and pressed for change. At the Brisbane Conference in 1921 they forced through a motion that adopted ‘The  Socialisation of Industry, Production, Distribution and Exchange’ as the Labor Party objective. The parliamentarians, acutely embarrassed, managed to persuade the Conference to adopt immediately two follow-up motions which watered down the socialist objective before it got off the ground.”

Harry the bookmaker recalled the anger this caused among progressive workers and led to many joining the  then recently formed Australian Communist Party.

Over 100 years later in 2026, there are still many rank and file members and/or supporters of the Labor Party who are following the same path as Harry the bookmaker in 1921 who see even mildly progressive motions on key issues such as AUKUS, gambling, right to strike, renewable energy get canned by Labor leaders or watered down to become ineffective.

In 1921, a time when the Russian Revolution gave hope to millions of workers across the world for socialism, joining or supporting a Communist Party seemed a logical and practical option.

In 2026, millions of Australian workers and workers in other countries are learning through their own experiences the dead-end of what the Australian Worker in 1921 described as “a respectable parliamentary party”.

This trend is bound to continue as people look for a new social system based on people’s needs, not greed, wars of aggression and profit.

It is this trend among the people that is the reason why the corporate minority class try to divert people towards ultra right-wing politicians like One Nation on the one hand, while at the same time try to boost the profile of the “respectable parliamentary party” type such as ALP.

 

The Trump Administration and the scramble for the Pacific sea-bed

Written by: (Contributed) on 17 August 2026

 

(For more than a decade, people have struggled to stop deep-sea mining in the Marian Trench)

Diplomatic tensions between key Pacific islands and the Trump administration over the role of US mining companies seeking to exploit mineral rich deposits look set to escalate. The position taken by the Trump administration has cast further light upon the dysfunctional nature of their foreign policy.

It has, moreover, far-reaching implications for US hegemony across the wider Indo-Pacific region, already the focus of diplomatic concerns about China and the future prospects of Taiwan. On 15 February 2025 China and Cook Islands signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in which they agreed to collaborate to research and potentially extract the latter’s seabed critical minerals. 

In early August, a major diplomatic statement issued by the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands Governor, David Apatang, noted the Trump administration had made plans to allow mining companies access to deep-sea mining exploration, despite strong opposition from local people. (1) Concerns have also arisen about similar planning in the close proximity of Samoa.

The Marianas Islands and Samoa both rely upon the US for their defence and security provision. The Pentagon also regard the two countries as 'strategic assets', forming part of island chains used to restrict access and egress by China, into the wider Oceania area of the Pacific.

The Marianas Islands are regarded as particularly sensitive for two reasons: the southern island of Guam hosts military intelligence facilities which swing on an arc from Pine Gap to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and their Pacific counterparts. (2) The Pacific is also used by the US to host other sensitive military and intelligence facilities. (3) The Pentagon has also installed radar and missile systems on remote parts of island chains. (4)

The Western Pacific has also become a potential flashpoint for real-war scenarios between the US and China. A US Congressional Commission, for example, issued an official statement nearly a decade ago that 'the US is no longer clearly superior … and that it would struggle to win wars against China or Russia'. (5) The balance of forces has continued to swing still further during the past decade. And it continues to do so.

In fact, the commission recommended that the US should respond by 'further relying on traditional allies, including Japan and Australia'. (6) Recent high-level diplomacy between Canberra and Tokyo, therefore, is best assessed in that light. The controversy surrounding the 'melons' affair has been a convenient way of concealing other, more pressing, agendas.

Secondly, environmental concerns, including marine life and oceanic migrations, remain important for local Pacific islanders. Many local residents live subsistence lifestyles and any move to interfere with the environment potentially has far-reaching implications for whole communities.

What remains an important matter for consideration is that the Trump administration has been noted for not having undertaken any consultation about its Pacific foreign policy initiative. Swashbuckling bravado, instead of standard diplomacy, was the order of the day.

A diplomatic statement issued by the governments of the Marianas Islands, Guam and Samoa, has stated that they want a 'temporary ban on deep-sea mining in their territorial waters'. (7) All three, however, acknowledge that they 'have little say'. (8)

The moves would appear, therefore, highly likely to prove counter-productive for the White House. The powerful Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), for example, has been diplomatically silent over the matter. No doubt, however, its members have watched over the moves.  

The Trump administration, nevertheless, appears ready to begin auctions of underwater terrain as early as November. Neo-colonial agendas for polymetallic nodules have taken priority over traditional foreign policy positions. (9)

A particularly worrying sign of the nature of the strained diplomacy between the US and the Pacific islands concerned has been their total failure of to consider the importance and significance of their exclusive economic zones. (10) The large zones carry considerable diplomatic significance inside region forums, including the PIF.  

The moves by the Trump administration will also have considerable bearing upon Taiwan. For nearly a decade Taipei has pursued a 'New Southbound Policy', with attempts to foster closer links with regional countries for its own defence and security provision. While it has faced a reduced number of official diplomatic links due to the One China policy, its role within regional forums and think-tanks should not be overlooked. (11) Taiwan maintains a regional presence.

Successive governments in Taipei, nevertheless, rely upon US support, and the moves by the Trump administration toward the Marianas Islands and Samoa can hardly be seen to enhance that position or inspire a sense of confidence that the White House remains supportive of smaller countries increasingly placed in front-line positions with emerging China. Rather, the Trump administration appears oblivious to counter-productive policies.

In fact, when assessed in light of recent developments in trouble-spots elsewhere, commentary includes opinions that 'while no doubt informed by credible assessment of available intelligence … the US … now risks handing a further propaganda tool', to adversaries. (12) The intelligence assessments obviously exist, there is little evidence, however, the Trump administration even reads them, let alone studies them in the context of maintaining workable foreign policy initiatives. Dysfunctional remains an apt explanation.

Meanwhile, Canberra has remained diplomatically tied to Washington and the Pentagon with the so-called 'alliance'. 

It is a diplomatic relationship fraught with very real dangers with the threat of real-war scenarios looming on the horizon:

                                          We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     Deep-sea mining ban push, Australian, 7 August 2026.
2.     Map of the World, Peters Projection, Actual Size; and, US intensifies military presence in the Indo-Pacific, The Global Times, 24 July 2018.
Jennifer L. Anson, 14 February 2020.
4.     See: US Indo-Pacific Command proposes new missile capabilities to deter China, RFA., 5 March 2021; and, US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain, Nikkei, 5 March 2021.
5.     Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
6.     Ibid.
7.     Pacific islands alarmed, MSN / AFP., 6 August 2026.
8.     Ibid.
9.     Australian, op.cit., 7 August 2026.     
10.   US v. China, op.cit., 14 February 2020.
11.   See: Beijing keeps a wary eye on new Taipei outpost, Australian, 18 June 2018.
12.   Trump's secret catering cart switch over threats, Australian, 12 August 2026.

US developing kinetic and non-kinetic weapons for space war

Written by: Nick G. on 17 August 2026

 

With China and the US locked in a race to be the first to establish a manned base on the Southern Pole of the Moon, the US is making no secret of its plans to establish its space supremacy by military means.

We have reported on US objectives in the past, but it is worth repeating with every new expression of the US intention to militarise space.

The latest comments came on August 12 2026 at the US Army Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Alabama. 

US Space Command (SPACECOM) head Gen. Stephen Whiting, told attendees that SPACECOM’s top two priorities for fiscal 2029 through to 2033 are “integrated space fires” and capabilities to counter large constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) in order to establish space superiority.

“We’re a combatant command and we fight to win wars. To win, we need credible, acknowledged, kinetic and non-kinetic fires. They are a key component of how we establish space superiority and restore credible deterrence,” he said.

Kinetic refers to the movement of a physical body such as a missile for the purpose of the destruction of an adversary’s material assets; non-kinetic refers to such movement as use of radio waves for jamming an adversary’s communications systems.

Whiting’s deputy, Lt. Gen. Rick Zellmann, on Tuesday told the symposium that the US military now has “policy” approval for three basic types of space fires: ground-to-space fires that “we’ve been doing for years” with “communications jamming systems;” space-to-space attacks known as “orbital warfare;” and, given that the Trump administration plans to build space-based interceptors for the US Golden Dome missile shield, space-to-ground.

Responsibility for ground to space fires is shared with the Army, the Air Force and Marines, but orbital warfare and space to ground fires are the preserve of SPACECOM.

It would be wise to assume that both Russia and China are developing similar capabilities. 

The UN Outer Space Treaty prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space, but there are many weapons that do not fit either definition, so there is no real internationally binding prohibition on the militarisation of space.

Both major imperialist blocs are engaging in space in anew version of the “scramble for Africa” during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

It is a measure of how little imperialism has advanced humanity’s aspirations for overcoming commercial greed and warfare that its reach now extends into space.