Saturday, September 14, 2019

US fears Solomon Islands may switch to Beijing

(Contributed)                        15 September 2019

The announcement by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare of the Solomon Islands that his government was seriously considering switching diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China, has far-reaching implications for Australia and US-led regional military and security provision.

If the diplomatic shift goes ahead part of the present status quo in the South Pacific will be altered; a significant shift in the balance of forces will have taken place in favour of Beijing 

Shortly after re-election in April, PM Sogavare established a task force to evaluate the continued significance of the Solomon’s 40-year diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. It was not a low-ranking collection of government advisers from the small South Pacific country; to the contrary, the task force included eight government ministers and the PM's private secretary. The nine-personal delegation was sent to Beijing in August for high-level diplomatic meetings, as evidence that the new, incoming government in Honiara was taking the matter very seriously. (1)

The Solomon Islands has, historically, formed part of a three-country bloc of Melanesian countries to the north of Australia, strategically-placed between Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu in the South Pacific. In recent times the small area has become highly sensitive for US imperialism’s miitary and security considerations: the Australia-US Ministerial Consultations last year included several contributions dealing with the perceived problem. The then Australian Foreign Secretary Julie Bishop stated the South Pacific was regarded as 'Australia's part of the world'. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo subsequently raised serious concerns about the area and the need for 'greater US-Australian co-ordination and engagement across the region, including the noted Pacific Islands' to deal with matters arising. (2) 

Shortly after the completion of the AUSMIN meetings, a media release from Canberra announced that 'Australia's intelligence and analytical agencies believe that the South Pacific now presents the greatest strategic threat to Australia', following assessments about China in the region. (3) 

Sensitivities by Canberra about the region were also later revealed in a short media release which accompanied references to the removal of PNG Prime Minister Peter O'Neill, who had been held responsible for elevating his country’s diplomatic relations with China, which raised serious concerns with Canberra. (4) The accompanying article, concerned specifically about the Solomon Islands, drew attention to the Pacific which was regarded as 'front and centre of Australia's strategic outlook'. (5)


The Solomon Islands has also, historically, been part of a small group of countries maintaining diplomatic links with Taiwan. Its strategic position in the South Pacific, has been closely linked to five other Pacific countries to the north: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu. The geographical positions of the five northern countries across Micronesia and Polynesia, all retain enormous strategic importance for US imperialism’s regional considerations. (6)
The fact the Solomon Islands lies on the dividing and demarcation line for the US Naval 7th and 3rd fleets, has revealed its strategic significance in wider military considerations: the straight line, drawn by the Pentagon, effectively dissects the region from the Frontier for the Northern Sphere, the Arctic, to the Frontier for the Southern Sphere, Antarctica, and also cuts directly through the highly sensitive Micronesia region. (7)

In recent times the military facilities based on Guam have been developed into a hub for military operations in the wider region, coinciding with similar moves on US facilities elsewhere on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. There has been little ambiguity with the US-led military planning: both Guam and Diego Garcia rest upon the same arc from Pine Gap, a US intelligence facility in central Australia. (8)

The two hubs, likewise, have also been linked to the development of Darwin harbour as a military support centre in northern Australia, which has also included two further considerations (9): an increased number of US military personnel rotated through Darwin in preparation for deployment elsewhere in the region; the Australian Defence Department planning a new military force based in Brisbane 'to work with key regional neighbours', including those in the South Pacific. (10)

The developments involving Australia are directly linked to wider considerations.

Throughout the Trump administration, Taiwan has been central to much of the US-led moves to reassert their hegemonic position and counter China as a regional player. In fact, Washington and the Pentagon have pushed Taiwan to the forefront of regional rivalries and used the country as 'a bulwark against China's growing assertiveness in South-east Asia and the Pacific'. (11) It is, therefore, important to note that Taiwan has become an important player for US-led regional Cold War positions against China throughout the wider region.

US-led diplomacy toward Taiwan has, therefore, included three important considerations: enhancing the political status of President Tsai Ing-wen while taking diplomatic missions elsewhere, using the enhanced status for increased influence over her administration, and increased arms sales to bolster Taiwan's military capacity.
President Tsai Ing-wen has been, for example, made a welcome guest in the US and allowed to stay in the country for lengthy periods in transit-flights for elsewhere. The moves have been regarded by Beijing as a serious challenge to usual diplomatic protocol (12).

It has been accompanied by a more audible demand from some of those close to the Taiwanese president for the country to strive for full independence within the global arena, challenging the traditional position of China that Taiwan is nothing more than a renegade province in a matter, as yet, unresolved from 1949.

Increased US arms sales to Taiwan recently included a $2.2 billion consignment including tanks and anti-aircraft missiles, followed by a further sale of 66 new F-16 fighter jets valued at $11.8 billion. (13)

Recent diplomatic moves by the Solomon Islands toward China have, therefore, run counter to the position of the Trump administration and US-led regional military  and security provision. To date, however, there has been no official US acknowledgement of the problem: their diplomatic silence has, nevertheless, been deafening.

Two media releases dealing with the matter from elsewhere were very carefully-worded to avoid unnecessary publicity:

• The first, issued by executive-director of the Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Peter Jennings, and hidden amongst about ten short paragraphs, noted 'Australia and the US wanted Taiwan to preserve its position in the Pacific.....it suits our interests and the American interests if Taiwan has a number of Pacific Island states recognising it rather than the mainland' (14). When Mr Jennings then concluded the ASPI media release noting 'the US absolutely expects us to play the lead role in preserving the status quo in the region', there was little ambiguity about the nature of US-led diplomacy toward the region and the role which had been thrust upon Canberra (15); 

• Secondly, a brief media release from Taipei dealing with the matter included reference amongst five paragraphs to President Tsai Ing-wen urging the Solomon Islands to not switch diplomatic allegiance to Beijing. (16)

In conclusion, it should be noted, the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sogavare government in Honiara will be making their final report about the matter on 31 October. Whatever the outcome of their findings and recommendations the whole affair is likely to remain a central military and security consideration for Canberra as attention shifts to a small, and previously almost ignored, small country in the South Pacific heavily dependent upon foreign aid where over half the population live in poverty with no access to electricity. The stakes for the US, and their regional considerations, remain very high indeed!

We need an independent foreign policy!

 

1.     Honiara weighs cutting Taiwan, Australian, 5 September 2019.

2.     US to lift its Pacific clout to counter China, Australian, 26 July 2018.

3.     Top threat now lies in the Pacific, The Weekend Australian, 22-23 September 2018.

4.     Flip-flopping O'Neill clings to PNG power, Australian, 28 May 2019.

5.     Solomons not prepared for pivot to China: MP, Australian, 28 May 2019.

6.     The South-West Pacific and Sino-US competition, Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International, 23 July 2019.

7.     Fundamental Study of American power, H. Fudzii, (Tokyo, 1986), Chart 2, p.20; and, Map of the World, Peters Projection, Actual Size.

8.     US intensifies military presence in the Indo-Pacific, Global Times (China), 24 July 2018.

9.     Ibid.

10.   More US Marines than ever head for Darwin, Australian, 23 August 2018; and, Australia sets up force for Pacific, Australian, 23 July 2019.

11.   F-16 sales to Taiwan cross Beijing's red line, Australian, 26 August 2019.

12.     Taiwan's leader visit to NY sparks fights, The Weekend Australian, 13-14 July 2019.

13.   Australian, op.cit., 26 August 2019.

14.   Australian, op.cit., 28 May 2019.

15.   Ibid.

16.   Taiwan urges Solomons to reject China, Australian, 10 September 2019.

 

Free West Papua!

(Photos from rally in Melbourne on September 14 2019)


Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist)            15 September 2019

The Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) expresses its utmost support and solidarity with the people of West Papua in their struggle for self-determination and independence, and their fight against racism and discrimination which is rooted in the long history of colonial and imperialist oppression of West Papua.

The recent mass protests that have erupted and spread across much of West Papua and in parts of Indonesia, mark the latest round of resistance by the West Papuan people to nearly 60 years of oppression, torture, and dispossession under Indonesian occupation, which began following the subversion of a UN referendum process on independence from Dutch colonial rule.  



The protests began on August 17, Indonesia’s Independence Day, when West Papuan students living in the Indonesian city of Surubaya were attacked, arrested and racially abused by ultra-nationalists with the support of the police following a Papuan independence protest. The repression sparked a wave of mass rallies and protest actions not seen for years.

Indonesia has responded to the outpouring of sentiment for independence and freedom with further repression and violence. Reports suggest an additional 6,000 troops have been sent to the already highly militarised region, adding to the 45,000 permanently stationed there. Internet connection has been cut limiting the flow of information in and out of the region. Restrictions on journalists and foreign tourists are also in effect.

West Papua’s ongoing subjugation by Indonesia is supported by US imperialism and its regional henchman Australia. Both governments provide support and training to Indonesia’s National Armed Forces. The Armed Forces are used to repress the West Papuan’s struggle for self-determination and secure the region’s vast natural resources for exploitation by imperialist multinational mining and energy companies such as Freeport-McMoRan, BP, and Rio Tinto.



Our call to support the movement for a free West Papua should not be construed as an attack on the people of Indonesia. Australian workers and Communists, particularly those amongst the waterside workers and seamen, played an honourable part in the Indonesian people’s struggle for independence from Dutch colonialism. It is against imperialism, colonialism, and all forces of reaction that we must direct our struggles. These are the forces that suppress, attack, and cause suffering for the vast majority of the world’s people. The struggle of West Papua is therefore the struggle of the global masses, including the majority of Indonesians and Australians, and we must all stand in solidarity with the people of West Papua in their fight for self-determination and independence.



In Australia, we encourage people to take action in support of the people of West Papua by attending solidarity rallies and protest actions being held around the country; supporting organising efforts of local representative bodies of the West Papuan struggle such as the West Papuan Rent Collective; sharing news and information on social media; raising the plight of West Papua at meetings of unions and various community organisations etc. As the struggle now reaches a new peak and takes on various forms, international solidarity is of vital importance to the success of the struggle of the West Papuans for justice, freedom, self-determination and independence.


End the Indonesian occupation of West Papua!
Indonesian troops out of West Papua!
End Australian government support for the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the occupation!
Support a referendum on independence and respect the right to self-determination for the Papuan people!

Free West Papua!

...........................................

For previous statements of support for West Papuan self-determination, please see:

The Struggle for the Liberation and Independence of West Papua Continues  (19 Dec 2017)
…………………………….
Catalonia, Kurdistan, West Papua – uphold the right of nations to self-determination!  (Oct 4, 2017)

…………………………………
Widodo sends wrong message to West Papua (Nov 16, 2014)

……………………………..
Aborigines take up the cause of West Papuans  (Feb 24, 2013)
 

Sunday, September 8, 2019

US imperialism’s plans to incorporate Pacific Islanders in the ADF

(Contributed)                                 9 September 2019
A report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has revealed some important changes are being considered by US imperialism in using Australia as a southern hub for the military training of Pacific Islanders.
The ASPI is an influential advisory body within the corridors of power in Canberra and it is important to note the planning will draw Australia even closer into US-led operations and the new Cold War.
Three important considerations, therefore, arise, each with far-reaching implications for Australia, as it will:
 
• centralise Australia's position within US-led diplomacy and military training throughout the region, in conjunction with Japan;
• involve Pacific Islanders for deployment elsewhere with US-led military planning;
• create a tier of compliant Pacific Island military personnel to serve 'US interests', which may not be automatically compatible with the interests of their countries of origin.
 
The recent ASPI report about extending the Australian role for military training of Pacific islanders for US-led regional operations has provided further evidence of a stepping-up of US diplomacy and military planning for the Asia-Pacific region. (1) The idea of using Australian military facilities for training Pacific Islanders was quietly floated and then shelved a couple of years ago; it was noted at the time, for example, that 'defence force personnel from Pacific countries should have stints with the Australian Defence Force to boost their skills'. (2) 
 
While no apparent reason has been given for why the original plan was shelved, it was likely to be that the Australian role with the Pacific Islands has changed over recent decades; the ruling elites of the islands which guided their countries to independence, have now gone. In their place are political leaders which have tended to be more assertive of the rights and singular interests of their countries. Part of their political education was also witnessing the implementation of Australian-led aid programs which did little for the mass of the population who continue to live in dire poverty, with few meaningful life-chances and opportunities. The aid programs, however, did open the economies of Pacific Islands to wholesale exploitation of natural resources and minerals with 'capital-flight' lining the pockets of share-holders who lived elsewhere.
 
The issue of widespread environmental damage caused by mining techniques has also been regarded as serious by tens of thousands of villagers in Papua New Guinea, for example, those who lost their livelihoods with the development of the OK Tedi mine. (3) A similar pattern of complete disregard for local people and their rights by Australian-based mining companies was commonplace across the wider region.
 
The political education of the new rising elite has, therefore, been marked by an increasingly strained relationship with Canberra, which is regarded as doing little for most Pacific Islanders.
 
Studies conducted by PNG academic Patrick Kaiku have, for example, already drawn attention to the problem that 'Australia conveys a patronising image of the Pacific when citing the China threat. Labelling the islands as 'our patch' or 'sphere of influence' is an unproductive message'. (4)
 
US-led foreign policy toward the Pacific has also had to contend with an increased regional organisation of localised issues: bodies including the Pacific Islands Forum and Melanesia Spearhead Group, have been able to co-ordinate militant opposition to French colonialism in New Caledonia together with pro-independence sentiments in West Papua and Bougainville. (5) Traditional neo-colonial ties between the Pacific Islands and metropolitan capitals can no longer be taken for granted; a growing opposition has become clearly visible.    
 
The problem has also been exacerbated in recent times, by diplomacy conducted by China toward with many of the islands, which has given rise to an aggressive US-led diplomacy and military planning to 'push back' what are regarded as threats to traditional US hegemonic positions.
 
The recent ASPI report can, therefore, best be reviewed in the light of recent developments and a serious attempt by the US to use Australia as a regional hub for training provision to strengthen its strained relationship with the Pacific.
 
US-led regional diplomacy has, in recent years, made use of Australia and Japan as two regional hubs for 'US interests'. The so-called Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) has closely linked the three countries for military operations; the US provide the military planning, which is then channelled through the two hubs. Recent studies have concluded that 'Australian and Japanese militaries work together and almost as closely as they do with the US', and, 'both Canberra and Tokyo have an interest in expanding their maritime co-operation', together with references to, 'Tokyo's regional outreach partnering with Australia'. (5) 
 
Other recent studies, likewise, have established increased US reliance upon Australia; the same arc and radius which links US intelligence facilities based on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean with Pine Gap also swings through Guam, another strategically-placed US military facility in Micronesia. Both facilities have also been upgraded by the US in recent times as hubs for military operations. (6) It is also significant to note a similar arc also swings through Singapore, which has hosted facilities for the expanded JORN radar system which is being updated at the present time. (7) The arc would appear to have provided US-led military planners with a demarcation line for Australian responsibility toward the region, including a large section of the Pacific.
 
The ASPI report can, therefore, be seen as an important contribution toward US-led diplomatic and military initiatives toward the wider region and the implementation of the new Cold War.
 
The report begins with the claim the ADF requires more personnel in line with a government defence budget of $200 billion for equipment programs for new systems. There is little ambiguity, however, with the wording and role of Australia for regional operations. While paying attention to 'our Pacific step-up', without open reference to the US-led initiative, it stated, 'we need to attract foreign nationals here whose skill is a willingness to serve in the ADF. We should consider recruiting Pacific Islanders for our military'. (8) 
 
Further into the report is a proposal that 'we should consider inviting Pacific Islanders into our military for a three to four year period'. (9) The time-span concerned being similar to a basic term of duty or training within a military academy, with reference to 'skills transfer' and 'our Defence Force conducts world-class training and skills in everything from medicine to engineering to all trades, leadership and management'. (10) It recommended down-playing the notion of 'guest-workers', although it was acknowledged that 'remittances back to home countries would be hugely beneficial to the islands'. (11)
 
The contentious issue of citizenship is then dealt with toward the end of the report; Pacific Islanders have, historically, been regarded as rather different to the white, Anglo-based middle classes which have tended to dominate ADF considerations and military careers. The report did, nevertheless, acknowledge 'citizenship might even be offered on completion of service', but that 'some, not all, would stay in Australia'. (12) It did not elaborate on the reasons for the problem of 'the very low number of Pacific people in our country', although anyone with a sensible approach to the matter would acknowledge racism and discrimination toward black people remains a prevalent problem in contemporary Australia. (13)  
 
But every cloud for the ASPI, including those problems which they refrain from openly acknowledging, has a silver-lining: on completion of their military service with the ADF, Pacific Islanders would return to their countries of origin. They would be, in the terminology of the report, 'returning veterans', responsible for bringing 'these skills and attitudes back to their homes. Many would join home security services, government business or politics, further strengthening institutional links between Australia and the Pacific'. (14)
 
No reference was given, however, to the notion of 'ground-human', a US military term used for a localised agent of influence who had specialist knowledge of an area. Continual updating of surveillance technology has provided those within the higher echelons of class and state power with hugely powerful facilities for monitoring developments; a satellite image of a building, however, requires accurate identification for any meaningful assessment of an area to be made. Intelligence operations require a human on the ground. 
 
The reference to returning veterans can, perhaps, also be regarded as a sinister twist to the whole endeavour outlined by the ASPI: amid the flowery language of 'Pacific cousins', reference was also given to their possible, and under present-day circumstances, highly likely, 'deployment throughout the Indo-Pacific or in the islands themselves'. (15) Having been trained in Australia, Pacific Island military personnel were likely to be pushed into the forefront of Pentagon-planned real war scenarios.
 
And in conclusion, the ASPI report leave their punch-line about the nature of Canberra-based aid programs until the final paragraph, where it is stated that 'having Pacific Islanders being part of the delivery of Australian programs to the Pacific states' would be more appropriate and 'will make that engagement much more effective'. (16) Reference, however, was not given to Pacific Islanders being used for out-sourcing US-led regional policies, channelled through Australia in what would appear predominantly military-style repressive techniques.
 
Two final matters have to be considered as highly relevant:
 
• the ASPI report can best be regarded as a rather patronising approach to the re-establishment of more effective neo-colonial relations between US-led regional initiatives and Australia with the Pacific Islands;
• older military training manuals from the previous Cold War would appear to continue to provide the blue-print for current ASPI position. One, covering basic military provision for Organisation and Tactics, carefully laid down the role of the military in the sphere of civil affairs. It acknowledged the military were incapable of undertaking longer-term government functions, although it should retain the role of 'exercising general supervision' over civil affairs in line with a systematic strengthening of the State. The thinking would appear to underlie much of the ASPI report:
  
We need an independent foreign policy!
 
1.     Pacific Islander Boots Would Help Defence Step Up, Australian, 3 September 2019.
2.     Don't take Pacific role for granted, says Labor, Australian, 21 April 2017.  
3.     Wikipedia: OK Tedi Mine, which has provided basic information about background to problems arising with the former BHP-owned mine which was responsible for environmental discharges downstream which affected 50,000 people living in a 120 small villages, dependent upon clean water-supplies for their vegetable gardens and traditional agrarian life-styles. The mine destroyed whole areas of the Western Province of PNG.
4.     China casts a spell on PNG, Australian, 20 September 2018.
5.     See: Regional Implications, pp. 17-18,
                Neighbouring Melanesian Fragilities, pp. 18-19,
                Broader shifts in the Pacific, pp. 19-20,
        New Caledonia's independence referendum: Local and regional implications, The Lowy Institute, May 2019.
6.     Japan's Security Identity in the Indo-Pacific, Implementing the Indo-Pacific: Japan's region building initiatives, Perth-US Asia Centre, August 2019, Chapter 6, pp. 86-98.
7.     US intensifies military presence in the Indo-Pacific, Global Times, 24 July 2018.
8.     Radar Surveillance, World Today, ABC News, 16 December 2019.
9.     Australian, op.cit., 3 September 2019.
10    Ibid.
11.   Ibid.
12.   Ibid.
13.   Ibid.
14.   Ibid.
15.  Ibid.
16.   Ibid.
17.   Ibid.