US pushes for stronger control over South Pacific

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong listens in to Kamala Harris

 Written by: (Contributed) on 27 July 2022

Addressing the recent Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Suva, Fiji, in mid-July, US Vice-President Kamala Harris provided a Cold War diplomatic message which included the announcement that the US was opening two new embassies in Tonga and Kiribati, enlarging the regional Peace Corps provision, having an envoy to the PIF, and providing $600 million for economic development programs. (1) The diplomatic statement followed an earlier announcement the US was planning to re-open their embassy in the Solomon Islands, which was closed in 1993.

The fact that Tonga is part of Polynesia, Kiribati part of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands part of Melanesia, would tend to indicate the US is planning to establish the three countries as minor regional hubs and spokes, attached to broader regional planning over-ridden by Australia and Japan. The arc between Kiribati and Tonga, furthermore, swings through sensitive Australian military institutions in Queensland. (2) The Solomon Islands also forms part of the triangulation: references, therefore, to 'the regional surveillance centre in the Solomon Islands', reveal a significant part of the US regional military and security provision. (3)

Queensland, with nine military bases, is also regarded in defence and security circles as the front-line for Australian military operations. One military facility, Lavarack, near Townsville, hosts the 3rd Combat Signals Regiment, the 141st Signal Squadron and the 11th Combat Service Support Battalion. (4) Lavarack is also situated at an angle of 175 degrees east to Kiribati, and rests on a horizontal line to Tonga, at 21 degrees south, cutting through New Caledonia, another regional country of extreme significance to US planning. The triangular arc contains the south-west Pacific, which in recent times has been a major preoccupation for the Pentagon and its Cold War diplomatic stance with China. (5)

It has not been coincidental that the US focused their recent diplomatic efforts upon the PIF: following the 2019 Australian diplomatic debacle at the forum, China moved to win the 'hearts and minds of the PICs in a win-win situation'. (6) The fact that two of the countries at the forum, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands also switched their diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China later in the same year further increased China's strategic opportunities in the mini-regions.

While the three Pacific regions remain relatively small, with a total population of about 11.9 million, the countries have large exclusive economic zones, spreading over 7.7 million square miles of ocean, making them important factors for military considerations. (7) The large number of officially independent countries also provide enhanced lobbying power in international forums, including the United Nations.

It is important, therefore, to note the three areas of the Pacific have had a long and troubled history which has included colonial subjugation, 'black-birding', and in more recent times neo-colonialism based on the exploitation of vast mineral and natural resources and cheap labour. Many US mining companies, for example, use Australian-based company facilities for regional operations and the siphoning of wealth to elsewhere; they invariably keep their share-holders happy by paying large dividends while most citizens remain in poverty.

One of the main problems facing the US and their regional allies, Australia and Japan, however, has been accessing reliable intelligence about regional developments. While Pacific countries have become aid-dependent, many of their citizens remain suspicious about western interests in their countries: many foreigners, for them, come with dubious intentions, not necessarily in their own interests. In fact, it might be noted that the US and their allies have been shown repeatedly to be blissfully ignorant of local developments, languages and customs.

Military and security considerations are also problematic: while each country across the region has its own intelligence services, they are largely over-ridden by Australian counterparts in the southern part and Japan in the north. The military and security provision is then further over-ridden by US regional facilities which rely upon Pine Gap and other Australian-based sensitive facilities. But while it remains a technological achievement to fly a surveillance satellite over an area or monitor telecommunications, it is, however, another matter to access reliable intelligence from well informed local sources at ground level, referred to in official jargon as 'ground-human'.

References in Kamala Harris's diplomatic announcement, therefore, to the PIF and that the US was planning for increased Pace Corps provision in Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu, together with re-establishing the US Agency for International Development (AID) has little to do with economic development programs; they are intended for assisting the US to access reliable grass-roots intelligence and establishing networks. (8) The Peace Corps and the AID have long been hosted in US embassies overseas, and many of their programs have been highly questionable.  

And the fact that the Australian defence forces have already undertaken joint counter-insurgency training with the Tongan counterparts as part of recent RIMPAC exercise, can best be viewed as a prelude to greater and larger US-led regional military programs. (9) Counter-insurgency provision is, invariably, linked to counter-intelligence and Cold War diplomatic positions and the politics of repression.

Reading publications from the previous Cold War throw extensive light upon present US diplomatic positions: references, for example, that 'US administration believes that the political and economic interests of the United States, security and stability in the region and its allies' trust must be based on military power … the US has a wide network of military bases and installations in foreign territories … as a kind of Asian NATO', show the connection and continuation of US projections from previous to the present Cold War. (10)

These US-led defence and security developments have drawn Australia even closer to the increased likelihood of real-war scenarios. When US Indo-Pacific Co-ordinator, Kurt Campbell, stated earlier this year the that region will most likely 'witness a strategic surprise over the next year or two', it provided a serious insight into their military planning. (11)

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!

  

1.     Countering China's influence at the Pacific Forum, The Weekend Australian, 16-17 July 2022.
2.     See: Peters Projection, World Map, Actual Size.
3.     Pacific ahead of the curve on challenges facing Indian Ocean, Australian, 18 July 2022.
4.     See: Wikipedia – Australian Military Bases.
5.     Peter Projection, op.cit., World Map.
6.     China's strategic objectives and ambitions in the south-west Pacific, Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International, 31 October 2019, pp. 3-4.
7.     The south-west Pacific and Sino-US competition, Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International, 23 July 2019, pp. 1-2.
8.     Americans prepare for big Pacific push, Australian, 13 July 2022.
9.     Forces combine, Australian Government – Defence, 8 June 2022.
10.   See: Disarmament, The view from Moscow, Asia-Pacific region, Vyacheslav Bunin, Novosti (Moscow, 1988), page 9, 29, and 33.
11.   Americans prepare, Australian, op.cit., 13 July 2022.

Imperialism and the scramble to control SW Pacific Exclusive Economic Zones

 

Written by: (Contributed) on 12 December 2020

An article published by a Japanese right-wing media outlet has inadvertently provided reliable information about problems confronting US imperialism in the Pacific.

The information is substantiated with similar reliable sources elsewhere.

Two important considerations have arisen:

• the failure of the US to prevent further problems with Taiwan's dwindling diplomatic recognition, with reference to US regional military and security provision;

 

• the failure of previous US-led regional foreign policy to facilitate self-sustainable economic development programs in the region has been shown to be counter-productive.

 

The problems have implications for Australia.

 

The mid-August edition of Japan Forward included an article about the changing balance of forces in the Pacific: traditional US domination has been seriously challenged by the rise of China as a competitor. (1) The on-line media outlet has a marked right-wing political stance on a variety of issues. Reactionary US former government officials, including John Bolton, are regarded highly.

 

The article in question focused upon the significance of both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China late last year. It noted that before the switch Taiwan and China had about equal recognition across the Pacific, with six countries each. The tally now is four to eight, but with another far-reaching implication: countries in the Pacific have, historically, had large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), providing rights to natural resources and sensitive shipping-lanes.

 

The EEZ of the Solomon Islands, for example, is 56 times the size of their landmass, the EEZ of Kiribati is 4,238 times the size of their landmass.

 

After the recent diplomatic switch with the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, Taiwan's access to Pacific EEZs was, therefore, reduced to 3,656,453 square kms, while China's has been increased to 13,252,247 square kms, a share of about 20 per cent to 80 per cent in favour of China.

 

Both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati are also strategically situated within parts of the region that US imperialism seeks to keep under its control.

 

The Solomon Islands forms part of the South Pacific buffer to the north of Australia.

 

Kiribati, similarly, is located in an area of the Pacific regarded as critical for the US military: it has three distinct areas within its massive EEZ which include the Gilbert Islands, the Phoenix Islands and the Line Islands, which form part of the US demarcation of the region with Island Chain Theory (ICT). Taiwan, and its diplomatic recognition, is regarded by the US as the lynch-pin of ICT.

 

The article also noted that most Pacific countries were unable to manage or develop their maritime resources without assistance from foreign powers. Regional surveillance has been provided by the US in conjunction with the Australian navy.  

 

Many of the small island landmasses also host sensitive monitoring equipment. US-led regional military planning, for example, has already focused upon Palau for hosting a high-frequency radar system to detect both air and sea targets.

 

Elsewhere, the US territory of Wake Island and Minami-Torishima, are regarded as 'critical bases for the A2AD military facilities'. (2)

 

Failure to promote economic development

 

For sixty years following the end of the Second World War, US-led regional diplomacy did not have to deal with serious competitors; it, however, squandered opportunities to facilitate sustainable economic development programs. Many of the small countries were needlessly exploited for their natural resources and raw materials, financial gain siphoned-off to shareholders’ dividends elsewhere, and not used to finance local projects. The US-led foreign policy followed a certain logic: countries condemned to economic backwardness tend to be easier to control by foreign powers, as was the case.

 

It is, therefore, not surprising the Japan Forward article noted both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati ‘changed their diplomatic allegiance to China … because … they needed assistance for economic development’. (3)  

 

It noted, furthermore, that a pressing problem facing regional governments has been the rapid population growth rates where upwards of fifty per cent of total populations are composed of the under-25 year age group. The problem of unemployment and under-employment has accompanied the failure of colonial and imperialist policy to promote economic development. It has created conditions whereby economic considerations have far-reaching political implications, in a region where instability of government institutions has been commonplace.

 

China, with its noted softer-style diplomacy, has, therefore, been able to move quietly into sensitive areas of the Pacific, and elsewhere, with relative ease. They already have huge economic developments projects across the wider region.

 

It has not been difficult to establish the changing balance of forces across the wider region and US moves toward dealing with the problem.

          

A recent statement from the Pentagon noted that 'Uncle Sam had lost assured command of the Western Pacific to its great power rival … China was now capable of controlling the South China Seas in all scenarios short of war with the US', and, 'the US war plan in the Western Pacific was now limited to fighting largely outside the first island chain, where Taiwan lies, with long distance strikes until forces could arrive'. (4) US military provision has usually been located either in Japan, Hawaii and Australia, with smaller garrisons elsewhere, including Guam.

 

The matters arising have far-reaching implications for Australia; as the strategic hub for US interests with large-scale troop rotations, Australia has been drawn ever closer to US-led regional operations, which, to date, have fallen just short of real-war scenarios.

 

As the competition to US domination escalates, Australia should have an independent foreign policy before greater problems arise with serious implications.

 

1.     Democracies must step up to counter China's dominance over the Pacific Islands, Japan Forward, 14 August 2020.

2.     Ibid.

3.     Ibid.

4.     US losing control of Pacific to Beijing, The Weekend Australian, 5-6 December 2020.

 

S.W. Pacific – the French Connection

Written by: (Contributed) on 6 December 2020 

Serious studies of the sensitive Pacific part of the wider Indo-Pacific region focus upon the rising US-led diplomatic hostilities toward China.

They tend, however, to overlook other, smaller regional players, which also have influence.

Such is the case with France, which has three colonies in the Pacific together with other important interests across the wider region.

France would also appear to be intent on using the three colonies as strategically-placed assets in conjunction with US-led diplomatic positions, with far-reaching implications for Australia as the southern regional hub for 'US interests'.

France is a major diplomatic player in the Pacific: its three colonies, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Fortuna, provide France with direct access into regional organisations including the Pacific Islands Forum.

French colonialism in the Pacific, despite emphasis on military and security considerations, is, however, primarily based upon economic factors.

New Caledonia, for example, has about ten per cent of the world's nickel reserves which are dominated by private French-based companies. France also has direct control of a vast seven million square kilometres exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Pacific, providing crucial access to sensitive shipping-lanes and oil and gas reserves.

France has developed neighbourly relations with Australia as a dominant southern regional hub for 'US interests'. While France has continually pushed 'Francophone cultural influence wherever that is possible', the balance of power in the Pacific remains based on strong Australian-French diplomacy. (1)

Military agreements

In 2016 Australia and France signed a defence agreement, which was subsequently updated in 2018 in conjunction with support from the Trump administration. It included intelligence co-operation in what had become a potential theatre of war for US-led military planning against China. French overseas intelligence, the notorious SDECE/DGSE, has a long history of regional operations. Military exercises now take place with Australian and French personnel in a variety of official capacities on the regular basis.

The defence agreements, however, rested upon earlier military co-operation with the 2012 Defence Co-operation Agreement and later involvement, by France, with the Quadrilateral Defence Co-ordination Group which evolved into the so-called 'Quad'.

French military presence, in the Pacific, has the following provision:

                                 New Caledonia         1,400 troops
                                 French Polynesia       900 troops
                                 Wallis and Fortuna    defence responsibility of France.

French military presence in its three colonies is supported by a civilian, settler population: in the Kanaky area of New Caledonia, 27 per cent of the population are French residents. These French public servants, often with strong links to the official military apparatus and tentacles of their vast, sprawling intelligence services, are paid high wages. They contribute toward an economic and social imbalance in the country: an estimated ten per cent of the capital city, Noumea, for example, live in shanty-towns; they form part of an under-class of nationals for French interests to exploit.

The timing of the military agreements between Australia and France also coincided with moves by the Pentagon to revamp Island Chain Theory (ICT), a relic of the previous Cold War. Present-day US-led military planning has continually pushed ICT agendas. They include the significance of Taiwan and the third and final part three of Oceania, where France has a significant stake with its three colonies. (see diagram)

The French regional military position has, therefore, tended to fit comfortably into the bigger US-led defence and security provision, resting on a vast network of facilities hosted by various governments across the wider region. (2)

We remember….

French regional foreign policy, also has a murky side.

In the mid-1980s, France was developing a nuclear capacity which they tested in the Pacific; their intelligence services were noted as possessing the Cold War mind-set that 'France's nuclear independence … was … under threat from a co-ordinated and implausibly diverse conspiracy of jealous Anglo-Saxons, long-haired environmentalists, island nationalist groups financed by communists, and the Soviets, whose submarines lurked in the azure waters off the atoll' and therefore sought to deal with those concerned in a covert operation, which began with agents infiltrating Greenpeace in Auckland, New Zealand. (3)   

The subsequent attempt by the SDECE/DGSE to destroy the Rainbow Warrior monitoring ship owned by Greenpeace, however, was as fundamentally flawed as the disposition of the conspirators, and botched; while continuing to reside behind plausible denial, it was noted 'the agents might as well have left a beret, a baguette and a bottle of Beaujolais at the scene of the crime', which included two bombs and a Greenpeace photographer dead. (4)

Australia has, nevertheless, continued to rely upon France and their gung-ho intelligence services for regional military and security provision.

Australian foreign policy, for example, with its emphasis upon the South Pacific as a buffer for military incursions from the north, has had to include New Caledonia as part of the same defence and security provision.

Independence?

Recent moves in New Caledonia to push an independence referendum have, therefore, had serious implications for Australian defence and security provision. While the recent vote was lost to French loyalists, a third and final referendum will take place in 2022. Australia, as a matter of course, has opposed the independence movement, although played-down its specific role in strengthening French colonialism for obvious reasons. Any publicity about Australian connivance inside the murky world of French foreign policy and the Pacific has serious implications; the position Australia has entered into with its support for French colonialism runs counter to its position held in the United Nations and other regional representative bodies which support independence movements.

As the stakes become ever higher for US-led regional military and security provision, Australia, however, is likely to be drawn toward the position of openly defending French colonialism in the Pacific, as a matter of course; the three French colonies will be increasingly regarded as vital strategic assets for the Pentagon. Their military facilities, likewise, will have increased significance for regional deployments of troops.

Moves to establish a third Australian space-port at Bowen in Queensland, similarly, may have some considerable bearing upon Australian-French regional diplomacy and military co-operation. Bowen is geographically close to New Caledonia. It has been noted that 'the Bowen space-port … is … a key location to support Defence's space requirements in coming years', which will, 'launch rockets across the Coral Sea', in conjunction with satellite systems. (5)

With these developments taking place: We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     Australia and France in the Pacific Ocean, New Eastern Outlook, 24 November 2020.
2.     See: US signs defence deal in Asia, The Guardian Weekly (U.K.), 2 May 2014; and,
        US eyes return to south-east Asian bases, The Guardian Weekly (U.K.), 29 June 2012.
3.     The French Secret Services, Douglas Porch, (London, 1996), page 456, page 460.
4.     Ibid., page 460.
5.     Blast off from Bowen, Queensland Defence, Australian, 25 September 2020.