Strategic Denial Rights, EEZ's, Rare Minerals: Palau And US Neo-Colonialism

(Above: the three island chains)

 Written by: (Contributed) on 3 January 2024

Palau is fast becoming a key strategic component in US-led regional military planning; the small Pacific country has increasingly been used by the Pentagon for military training and weapon technology transfer with Taiwan. Strategically placed within US-led Island Chain Theory (ICT), designed to restrict and control regional access and egress, Palau has recently signed a new agreement with the US to enforce their large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), thought to be rich in resources and rare deep-seabed minerals. The so-called US-led Strategic Denial Right (SDR), and other recent initiatives, have transformed Palau into a military hub for US-led operations. Political opposition to the war-mongering has taken place in recent times, in line with the present Cold War.

The US recently began moves to establish work on over-the-horizon radar facilities in Palau, coinciding with President Surangel S. Whipps Jnr., requesting the US station the Patriot missile defence system in the country for permanent regional deployment.  

Palau, a tiny country sandwiched between the Philippines and Guam, has become highly strategic for US regional military planning in recent years. Palau is also particularly close, in diplomatic terms, to Taiwan; the recent moves to install military facilities in Palau have coincided with Taiwan and the US signing a $83 million deal in 2022 to upgrade defence systems. (1)  The present presidential administration wants to further strengthen their diplomatic links to provide even greater inclusion with Taiwan. (2)

It is not difficult to understand why pro-US presidential administrations in both places have acted accordingly; Taiwan forms part of the first Island Chain, whereas Palau is part of the second chain. They are, therefore, central to attempts by the US to restrict China's regional involvement in the Pacific.

A military intelligence assessment submitted to US Congress in early 2021, contained the initial plan for 'the fielding of an Integrated Joint Force with precision-strike networks along the first island chain and integrated air missile defence in the second island chain'. (3) The estimated cost of the military plan amounted to $27.4 billion over a six-year period from 2021 to 2027. (4) It was not intended as a narrowly defined defence and security gesture, but with capability to 'dispense and sustain combat operations for extended periods'. (5)

The moves have also rested upon even longer-term military planning over a decade ago when a statement issued by the Congressional Research Service noted the US was 'laying the foundations for a region-wide missile defence system that would combine US ballistic-missile defences with those of regional powers, particularly Japan, South Korea and Australia'. (6) The defence system was subsequently updated to the present Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), with parameters from India, Japan, the US and Australia, to contain sensitive areas of the vast region. (7)

Palau, interestingly, is situated half-way between sensitive US military facilities at Pine Gap, central Australia, and their counterparts in Japan. (8) Other countries, close to Palau, have already hosted sensitive US military facilities, including satellite systems. (9)   

The fact the US has full diplomatic links with Palau, including an Embassy in the capital, Melekeok, and an Ambassador, Joel Ehrendreich, appointed in August, 2023, would clearly, highlight the importance placed on the tiny country with an estimated population of only 18,054, by Washington and the Pentagon. Palau, in the eyes of the Biden administration in the White House, cannot be regarded as a diplomatic backwater. Ehrendreich is noted on the official US Department of State website as a career diplomat, for example, with a 'deep and substantive background in East Asian and Pacific Affairs and previous regional assignments, coupled with nearly thirty years of Foreign Service experience make him a well-qualified candidate for Ambassador to Palau'. (10)  

Just what, therefore, does Washington and the Pentagon have in mind for Palau?

It is also particularly interesting to note the recent opposition in Palau to the US-led moves; fears have been raised about real-war scenarios with lethal AI-powered warfare, together with the country's Senate being opposed to the plans. (11) Due to the small size of the country and population, very little must be able to happen without residents becoming aware. Military facilities and fortifications must be easy to detect and visible. Palau, however, is a country strongly subject to US-led Cold War problems and it is difficult to establish how deep and widespread opposition is inside the country to the US military planning. Interests, perceived as being pro-China, are regularly met with accusations, even if not true. (12) Those willing to challenge US-led positions experience difficulty.

The recent moves by the US military have also included other initiatives, which appear more in line with traditional neo-colonial thinking. Recent diplomatic initiatives by China across the region, for example, have allowed it to gain access to about 80 per cent of the Pacific's EEZ's, which has been assessed as a serious threat to traditional US-led hegemonic positions. (13) The EEZ's are thought to be rich in natural resources, rare and deep-seabed minerals, which the US want to control and to restrict China's access.

The recent US-led military planning has, therefore, also included both Palau and neighbouring Micronesia signing deals with the US for warships to patrol their EEZ's to enforce 'strategic denial rights'; the Marshall Islands is also considering similar moves at the present time. The three countries possess huge EEZ's which straddle the first and second island chains, reaching almost to the Philippines and Indonesia. (14)

1.     Opinion: From Taiwan to Palau, The Island Times, 3 October 2023.
2.     Palau's president wants greater inclusion, BBC News, 16 December 2022.
3.     US Indo-Pacific Command proposes new missile capabilities to deter China, RFA., 5 March 2021.
4.     US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain, Nikkei, 5 March 2021.
5.     Ibid.
6.     US seeks new Asia defences, The Wall Street Journal, 24-26 August 2012.
7.     See: The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
8.     See: Peters Projection, World Map, Actual Size.
9.     China now controls 80 per cent of the Pacific EEZ., US v. China, Japan Forward: Politics and Security, Rieko Hayakawa and Jennifer L. Anson, 14 February 2020.        
10.   Website: US Department of State, Ehrendreich, Joel, 28 March 2023.
11.   Palau joins chorus, The Island Times, 19 December 2023; and, Palau – Opinion Observer, The Global Times, 21 December 2023.
12.   See: Failed Palau media deal, ABC News, 21 July 2023.
13.   China now controls 80 per cent of the Pacific EEZ., op.cit., 14 February 2020.
14.   Opinion, Island Times, 3 October 2023.

Palau technology upgrade to serve US military interests

 Written by: (Contributed) on 5 November 2020

The decision by the United States, Japan and Australian governments to provide Palau with underwater internet cable provision has little to do with improved services for general subscribers.

It is primarily concerned with improved military communications and extending the reach of US regional hubs into spokes and outlying strategically-placed countries.

The development can be best viewed with the following considerations:

     a further wave of US-led militarism;

     a further consolidation of Island Chain Theory;

     increased defence and security provision of one of Taiwan's major regional diplomatic
     contacts for 'US interests'.

A number of questions, therefore, have arisen about the Australian involvement. Answers, as yet, have not been forthcoming from official channels.

In October, the US and their two regional hubs, Japan and Australia, announced plans to finance the laying of a major 170 kms underwater internet cable to Palau, linked into the US mainland and Singapore network. (1) The plan followed similar moves last year when the US launched a Kacific 1 satellite system to provide improved mobile telephone services. (2)

Palau, a sprawling land-mass of about 340 islands with about 20,000 residents, has historically had strong links with the US; following independence in 1978, the country established the Compact of Free Association with the US and subsequently became an important offshore banking hub with a large international airport. Being situated on the western chain of the Caroline Islands, Palau is strategically-placed in the Pacific, east of the Philippines and north of Papua New Guinea, just inside the arc which swings from Diego Garcia to Guam from US regional intelligence provision based at Pine Gap.

Palau has major significance with Island Chain Theory, a relic of the previous Cold War which has become vogue military thinking, once again, in more recent times. (See diagram)

It is, therefore, not particularly difficult to establish why the recent internet cable was accompanied with an official diplomatic statement from Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne that the 'project and Australia's new embassy in Palau were part of the Morrison government's Pacific Step-up', a US-led regional position aimed at containing and encircling China's influences. (3) When Payne also stated 'we are very pleased to work alongside Japan and the US to support Palau's vision to strengthen its global internet connectivity', the moves had little to do with ordinary Palau residents having improved services.

While satellite communications provide relatively easy access to remote areas of the globe, problems arise with micro-second delays in transmission and reception creating difficulties with the levels of precision required by military planners to use military equipment for drones, surveillance geo-spatial facilities and missile defence systems. Cable provision, however, has the capacity to provide real-time transmission and reception requirements.

Palau would appear to have been placed in a front-line position with US-led regional military planning. Two months ago, US Defence Secretary Mark Esper visited Palau for high-level diplomatic talks with president, Tommy Remengesau Jnr. It was noted in official media releases following the talks, that 'Palau's request to the US remains simple: build joint use facilities, then come and use them regularly'. (4)

While committing Palau to troop rotations from the US, presumably in conjunction with similar rotations from northern Australia, the small Pacific country would appear to have been elevated in status for US-led regional military planning for future operations.

In fact, a recent statement from the Lowy Institute director of the Pacific Islands Program, Jonathan Pryke, gave reference to 'the security-focused cable project' in the context that 'Palau's approach stood out from other Pacific nations, which are trying to remain neutral in the increasingly contested region'. (5)

It is, therefore, interesting to note Palau is one of fifteen countries which continues to recognise Taiwan, an entity itself pushed to the forefront of regional diplomatic tensions by the Trump administration. While the US has always provided military support for Taiwan, in the last four years a dramatic increase in military spending and arms sales has taken place. (6) During the four years of the Trump administration, US aid was escalated to $US22 billion in comparison to the $US14 billion of the previous whole eight years of the Obama period. (7) The moves reveal a great deal about US Cold War diplomatic positions.

The moves have also been accompanied with the recent $US 250 million upgrade to the so-called American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which has provided working facilities for nearly five hundred staff who have diplomatic status and are officially on temporary leave from the State Department in Washington. (8) While, at one level, they exist, at another more sensitive and operational level, they do not in present-day US Cold War diplomacy.

The developments can best be viewed, therefore, as the implementation of a military plan early in the last decade where the US sought to transform their Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) 'into a spy service focused on emerging threats' and military intelligence-type assessments. (9) They are primarily concerned with the changing regional balance of forces; a central preoccupation for the present-day Pentagon and their AIT staff in Taipei. (10)

Palau has an important position in the whole plan, being a noted part of the 'New Southbound Policy' of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, where Taipei has sought to extend its diplomatic influence into regional dialogues organised by US think-tanks; their tentacles strike deep into the region for the specific defence and security of 'US interests'. (11)

It is significant to note the role taken by the present Australian government toward these developments. Why, for example, does Australia need an embassy and diplomatic staff in Palau? Any trade relations can, at best, be regarded as of minimal significance. Why should Australian tax-payers also subside Palau's internet services?
 
Australia, it can be seen, has assumed a compliant role in US-led military planning and directives for very likely future regional 'real-war' scenarios.

                                           
We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     Sea cable to keep Beijing at bay, Australian, 29 October 2020.
2.     Palau – CIA World Fact Book, 2020.
3.     Australian, op.cit., 29 October 2020.
4.     Ibid.
5.     Ibid.
6.     See: Wikipedia, US arms sales Taiwan.
7.     US to sell Taipei drones in $10 billion weapons deal, Australian, 18 September 2020.
8.     Beijing keeps a wary eye on new US Taipei outpost, Australian, 18 June 2018.
9.     Pentagon plays the spy game, The Guardian Weekly (U.K.), 7 December 2012.  
10.   See: Study – U.S. no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Paul D. Shinkman, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.   
11.   Australian, op.cit., 18 June 2018.