US arms sales to Taiwan a regional provocation

 Written by: (Contributed) on 25 September 2020

The announcement that the Trump administration was increasing arms sales to Taiwan has resulted in further diplomatic tensions with China.

The recent US diplomatic stand-off with China has focused on several regional flashpoints, with the South China Seas being a central concern.

The relationship of Taiwan to the South China Seas and their own strategic territorial claims has, however, been quietly pushed down US agendas to avoid unfavourable publicity.

In September, The Trump administration announced a further $7 billion arms deal with Taiwan, in addition to the already planned $15 billion allocated in previous defence budgets. The latest arms deal also included provision of a US$400 million package of MQ-9B Reaper drones, sensors, logistics, ground control stations, training and other related equipment. (1)

The latest arms deals also coincided with an official visit by US under-secretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, Keith Krach, to Taipei, where high-level diplomatic talks with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and President Tsai Ing-wen had been arranged. (2) The talks followed similar high-level diplomacy in August when US cabinet member, Alex Azar visited Taipei.

Similar diplomatic initiatives conducted by the Czech Republic, which included a large trade delegation to Taiwan, were also subsequently viewed by China in a very dim light. (3)

China, historically, has regarded Taiwan as a renegade province; any favourable diplomacy with Taipei has therefore been challenged by China, which has maintained territorial claims toward the small landmass.

The dramatic rise of China to become the world's second biggest economy, has altered the balance of forces across the Asia-Pacific region. It has been regarded by the US as a threat to traditional hegemonic positions. US Cold War diplomacy has subsequently drawn their regional allies even closer in an attempt to challenge perceived Chinese influences.

Several flash-points can be observed as a conspicuous part of the US-led wave of militarism sweeping the region: Australia and Japan are the two main regional hubs for 'US interests', with neighbouring countries clustered as spokes. A main Pentagon focus, however, has remained the South China Seas, a long, congested series of shipping-lanes which link the Asia-Pacific region with the Indian Ocean, Middle East and European markets.

China's recently constructed fortifications in the South China Seas have enabled ready access into Oceania and have, therefore, been regarded by the US as a serious challenge to their hegemonic positions. Little, however, has been openly stated by the US about Taiwan's strategic claims for the same areas; they are virtually the same as China's.

Taiwan has established sovereign access to Itu Aba, which they re-named Taiping Island, 1.4 kms long and 0.4 kms wide, adjacent to Ban Than reef and part of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands (see National Geographic map of the Nansha Islands above). It has also established living quarters on the island for a small permanent community, together with the construction of an airport, hospital, and other facilities to support long-stay inhabitants. (4)

A particularly significant feature of the Taiwanese strategic claim to the landmass has included the airport landing-strip and run-way which cover the whole length of the island, supporting a view that it was constructed for major logistics and military purposes. No publicity about the Taiwanese fortifications, however, has been noted in official US media releases.

Itu Aba, it should also be noted, is strategically-placed on the arc from Pine Gap which swings from Diego Garcia to Guam, which are major US-led regional intelligence facilities for military and security provision. The Taiwanese government has also linked Itu Aba with cell-phone and internet services which can easily be used for military communications.

The US regional intelligence presence with its surveillance of the Chinese fortifications tends to reveal their extensive use of satellite systems, which possess high-quality vision transmission to monitor details of the facilities when re-produced in mainstream media releases in photographic form. (5)

It is important to note the Cold War diplomatic silence from the US about other fortifications in the South China Seas has also followed the same common pattern: they only complain about China.

The Philippines, for example, occupies nine landmasses in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands  which were collectively re-named as the Kalayaan Island Group by previous presidential administrations in Manila. They have living quarters for about a hundred permanent residents and a military base. The Philippine military have also established an air-strip on nearby Pag-asa Island.

Vietnam has, likewise, established outposts in the same area of the South China Seas, which include infra-structure facilities. Malaysia has also established a top-end of the tourist market dive report with dual-use facilities as a naval base. (6)

Japan, as the northern regional hub for 'US interests', has also been a player with these US-led operations. In 2015 Japanese foreign policy initiatives included the provision of ten coastguard vessels to the Philippines and Vietnam. (7) It was also announced that Japanese funding for upgrading of a Philippine military base on Palawan Island was being considered, as the facilities were the closest to the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and therefore regarded as useful for rapid deployment. (8)

It is highly significant to note the latest US $7 billion arms deal with Taiwan has been largely composed of military equipment usually associated with intelligence-gathering and related military functions; drones and their ground-control equipment are used as surveillance systems together with tracking and targeting adversaries for assassinations.

Previous US arms deals with Taiwan were largely composed of military equipment usually associated with traditional defence and security provision, including tanks and armoured vehicles to prevent military incursions and aircraft for attack positions with strategic targets.

Taiwan also already has extensive air defence missile defence systems for surveillance purposes. (9)  

It remains to be established, therefore, where the latest US military equipment for Taiwan will be based, either on a permanent or temporary basis. Drones have a limited range although Taiwan's military facilities on Itu Aba provide coverage of the South China Seas for a variety of purposes. The silence, to date, however, would appear deafening: the Pentagon, clearly, do not want any publicity.  

With Australia being drawn into these US-led military plans for real-war scenarios, we need an independent foreign policy!

 

1.     US to sell Taipei drones in $10 billion weapons deal, Australian, 18 September 2020.
2.     Envoy's visit to Taiwan triggers Chinese military manoeuvres, The Weekend Australian, 19-20 September 2020.
3.     Military build-up blamed on America, Australian, 11 September 2020.
4.     Roque: We're not behind our rivals in reef dev't, The Philippine Inquirer, 9 May 2018.
5.     See: China installs cruise missiles on Phil reef, The Philippine Star, 4 May 2018.
6.     Philippine Inquirer, op.cit., 9 May 2018.
7.     Tokyo eyes new South China Seas role, The Age (Melbourne), 12 March 2015.
8.     Ibid.
9.     We will retaliate against Chinese attack: Taiwan, Australian, 23 September 2020.  

Taiwan: US imperialism’s excuse for war with China?

 

Written by: (Contributed) on 21 August 2020

The arrival of three US B-2 planes at Diego Garcia reveal a Trump administration preoccupation with Island Chain Theory (ICT) and Taiwan; they are desperate to reassert traditional regional hegemonic positions.

The development has also revealed the strategic importance of Australia for US regional foreign policy with sensitive intelligence facilities.

As diplomatic tensions between Washington and Beijing soar, Australia is locked into joint operations with US-led Pentagon planning for real-war scenarios.

In mid-August, an announcement that the US had placed three B-2 planes on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean revealed a further round of diplomatic tensions between the US and China.

The planes have a flight range of 11,000 kms and have operations linked to guidance provided by Global Positioning Systems (GPS); they form part of the 509th Bomb Wing which, in turn, is under the control of the Global Strike Command and can penetrate enemy defences without alerting usual radar facilities. (1)  

The deployment of the three planes has also revealed the importance of Australia for US-led regional planning. Diego Garcia rests on an arc from Pine Gap, central Australia, which also swings through Guam, another sensitive US military and intelligence facility in Micronesia.
Both Diego Garcia and Guam have been developed as bomber bases for regional deployments.

The US-led GPS facilities are also linked to the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which is also linked to Australian-based facilities.

While the reason provided by the Pentagon for the deployment of the three planes was a military exercise by China around the Zhoushan islands, 550 kms north of Taiwan, US-led intelligence assessments also fear China may be planning to occupy the Pratas/Dongsha islands (above) which at present are administered by Taiwan but claimed to be under Guangdong Province’s sovereignty by China. (2) The Pratas/Dongsha islands, strategically-placed 170 kms off the coast of Hong Kong and 400 kms south of Taiwan, are considered sensitive at the point linking the South China Seas with the wider Pacific, together with their close proximity to Hong Kong.

An added dimension to the development has been an announcement from Taiwan that President Tsai Ing-wen was considering leasing the Pratas/Dongsha islands to the US 'to deploy intelligence-gathering' facilities. (3) In recent times Taiwan has also sent two hundred marines to defend the islands which also have a large air-strip, for rapid deployment.

Moves in Taiwan have also coincided with the Trump administration re-using ICT as their main basis of demarcation within the region. Taiwan has central importance with the theory, of using control of islands to act as buffers, preventing China from ready access to areas of the region. The fact that Japan nationalised 280 island-masses on the basis of 'important national territories' is evidence the theory has also been previously regarded in Pentagon circles as important although not well publicised. (4)

While ICT was largely discredited during the previous Cold War it has served the Pentagon well with lines of defence and security and military planning when dealing with the rise of China. The US now has to deal with a competitor, which has been assessed as a major threat to traditional hegemonic positions as an adversary.

It is, therefore, no coincidence that the US has increased its unofficial support for Taiwan in recent times despite the US having switched diplomatic support to China in 1979 under the One China policy as ratified by the United Nations. They continued, however, to support Taiwan and in recent times the American Institute in Taipei, which functions in all but name as an official embassy, now has a staff of nearly five hundred US diplomats who are on temporary leave from the State Department. (5) It is also interesting to note recent moves to link Taiwan with Japan with 'maritime security, intelligence-sharing' facilities. (6)
 
An added dimension of Taiwan's strategic position for the US has included the New Southbound Policy of President Tsai Ing-wen, which has portrayed the country as a model for the Indo-Pacific region and functioned as an unofficial form of diplomacy to target countries with strong links with China.

It is, however, unofficial mechanisms and secretive networks used by the Taiwan which require greater scrutiny to establish their influence elsewhere: the so-called World League for Freedom and Democracy (WLFD), a far-right shadowy body is based in Taipei being a central feature of their unofficial diplomacy.

The WLFD was originally established as the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) by Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-shek although following unfavourable publicity as a major player in the Iran-Contra scandal, underwent name change while retaining the same political and intelligence functions. (7) Direct involvement with sanctions-busting with Iran and arms sales linked to massive drug trafficking in Central America, the US and elsewhere, could hardly be regarded as favourable publicity in the eyes of world leaders and their compliant middle-classes.

The WLFD is also linked to the notorious Political Warfare Department which has promoted Taiwanese foreign policy. As countries switched allegiance to China in the 1970s and 1980s, the organisation, subsequently, became more important. Shadowy Taipei-based figures, for example, developed strong links with right-wing dictatorships in Central and Latin America and elsewhere; the Political Warfare Cadres Academy provided training in 'unconventional warfare' which included use of institutional political parties to promote US and Taiwanese interests and para-military type organisations for clandestine operations. (8)   

WLFD involvement in the Philippines, historically, took place through established political organisations and far-right death squad-type activities. The main conduit for their operations was and remains the Marcos oligarchy, which is now vying once again for political power in forthcoming presidential elections in 2022. (9) Those associated with the Marcos dynasty are largely held responsible for the elimination of over a thousand trade-union and opposition figures in recent years. The large Philippine international diaspora has provided the WLFD with an additional network to promote their nefarious agendas elsewhere.

The WLFD also has strong Australian connections through established Liberal Party figures and far-right organisations. (10) They wield considerable influence in present-day Cold War Australia, while maintaining a low profile.

The deployment of three US B-2 planes on Diego Garcia is the logical outcome of an increasingly hawkish Cold War position by the Trump administration toward China. It has potentially dangerous, if not lethal, real-war scenarios as a main agenda item.

Australia has been drawn into this appalling diplomatic position through a series of sycophantic governments more inclined to kow-tow to 'US interests' and the so-called 'alliance' than the defence and security of our own interests:

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     Stealth bombers sent by US to Diego Garcia, Australian, 14 August 2020.
2.     Ibid. See also “Pratas Island tensions. Could this be war?” 
3.     Taiwan sends marines, Taiwan English News, 24 June 2020.
4.     Japan to nationalise 280 islands, The Age (Melbourne), 10 January 2014.
5.     Beijing keeps a wary eye on new US Taipei outpost, Australian, 18 June 2018.
6.     Ibid.
7.     The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, (New York, 1993), page xxx.
8.     Inside the League, Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, (Boston, 1986), pp. 56-9.
9.     Ibid., page 59, page 281.
10.   Ibid., page 59, page 276; and, WACL website: 9 January 1990, which provided coverage of their 1989 conference in Brisbane, Australia attended by John Howard, later Prime Minister, among the 120 delegates representing fifty countries.

For whom are we “projecting military power in the region”?

Written by: (Contributed) on 23 July 2020

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) acquisition of an anti-ballistic missile defence system is further evidence of the Trump administration’s escalation of Cold War hostilities toward China.

In early July the Morrison coalition government announced the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile defence system in Australia. The facilities formed part of the massive ten-year $270 billion defence budget. The official media release from the Defence Department specified the defence system would be used to 'project military power in the region and defend against adversaries seeking to launch attacks from targets such as the South China Seas'. (1)

With a stated range of 550 kms, the defence system would appear hopelessly ineffective when dealing with range from the South China Sea. The location of the defence system, therefore, has not been disclosed; nor has the country which will host the facilities.

This is the same region in which five Australian warships were “confronted” by the Chinese navy last week. The Australian ships sailed teasingly close to the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, acting as a cat’s paw for US imperialism. The Nansha Islands are within the so-called nine-dash line defining China’s territorial claim to the South China Sea. The line predates the coming to power of the Communist Party of China and was not disputed at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Australia. No doubt the Australian Navy would feel justified in “confronting” Chinese warships sailing provocatively through Torres Strait, to our north, or Bass Strait to our south.

The defence system itself, forms part of a regional-wide system, where radar facilities identify a missile's trajectory and then destroy it in flight before it reaches a target. Similar defence systems exist in various locations across the Indo-Pacific region and have been used  extensively for surveillance purposes. A major problem, however, with real-time intelligence has hampered US military positions. Computer systems operating with satellite transmission and reception tend to have a micro-second time delay, enough to make the defence systems inaccurate with fast-moving missiles. (2)

The US, however, has continued to deploy defence systems across the region on the stated basis they enable the US to 'focus and project our force in the Pacific'. (3) Analysis of the wording of the media releases leaves little to the imagination. It is, therefore, hardly surprising to find a recent statement from the Morrison government which specified the defence system was intended for 'greater focus on the immediate region and put adversaries on notice that Australia will respond with military force if needed'. (4)

Behind the scenes of recent developments, the Trump administration has pursued an agenda clouded in intrigue.

Reliable information about the changing balance of forces across the Indo-Pacific, for example, has not been difficult to establish: in November 2018, a commission established by Congress concluded the US was no longer a superior regional power. (5) The findings, however, were not accepted by the Trump administration.

The Pentagon subsequently established a special China Strategy Group, 'to focus the Pentagon's efforts on countering the growing threat'. (6) The organisation has recently issued a new strategic threat assessment, which has included the reviewing of all war-plans with China. (7)

And following suit closely has been the Morrison coalition government in Canberra which has tabled $270 billion for defence spending over the next decade. Real-war scenarios are clearly a main part of the agenda. Whether the stated anti-ballistic missile defence system, as a major component part of the plan, is ever actually operational remains as yet, however, to be established. If it is anything like the similar facilities based in Japan, it should be noted they were quietly shelved due to their stated inefficiency and protests from local people. (8)

With US-led military planning such as this taking place in Australia:

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!

1.     PM shoulders arms to China, Australian, 1 July 2020.
2.     U.S. seeks new Asia defences, The Wall Street Journal, 24-26 August 2012.
3.     Ibid.
4.     Australian, op.cit., 1 July 2020.
5.     Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, Paul D. Shinkman, 22 August 2019.
6.     China now biggest military threat: US., Australian, 10 July 2020.
7.     Ibid.
8.     Japan axes US missile defence, Australian, 26 June 2020.