Josh S.
2016 is
the100th anniversary of the Irish Easter rebellion.
It is timely
to explore some of the lessons and implications of the Irish revolt and
subsequent liberation struggle and independence negotiations
The Irish
independence movement always lacked a clear political framework or direction.
Despite the ruthless, callous, extreme economic exploitation of Ireland for
centuries by British imperialism and its local partners, the struggle focused on
political independence, and religious and cultural freedom, with little or no
demand for economic redistribution of land and wealth, and the transfer of
political power to the people at large.
A revolutionary ideological framework
is essential
The lack of a
clear revolutionary ideological framework allowed the leadership of the
movement and its array of organisations to comprise a hodgepodge of people of
widely differing class interests, ideologies, and abilities. There were insufficient
reference points or framework to guide and critique the leaders.
Debates,
disagreements and struggles among the leaders were often conducted on the basis
of personal interests and reputations; some strove for unity at any cost when
confrontation against opportunism was required, while others conducted petty
disputes, vendettas and power grabs.
This lack of a
framework and of an explicit policy of ideological struggle and principled
criticism and self-criticism in the movement overall, and its leadership in
particular, came to a head during the peace negotiations in 1921.
De Valera, the
recognised political leader and president of the self-proclaimed independent
government of Ireland, refused to attend the negotiations in London, knowing
that difficult compromises would be required. He claimed that he “needed to
keep the Head of State and the symbol (of the republic i.e. himself) untouched”
and “not compromised by any arrangements which it might be necessary for the plenipotentiaries
(i.e. the negotiators) to make”.
Instead, he insisted that Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith go to
London, with some others who would provide him with a channel of constant
information. He tried both to limit the negotiating team's scope for
negotiation, and, at the same time, wash his hands of any dirty details.
When the negotiators
returned with the agreement, he complained that it had not been submitted to
him personally before signing. He condemned it publicly and led the campaign
against it, despite clear overwhelming support for the treaty from the
population, leading to civil war.
De Valera's
crass left opportunism through the whole process, claiming leadership but
ducking the hard decisions required in negotiations, trying to control the
process but ducking responsibility, was not challenged on an ideological or
even ethical basis. He was allowed to get away with such behaviour because of
his personal power and reputation.
Similarly, several years
earlier, he unilaterally decided
to go to America for 18 months during the political and military struggle, but
still proclaimed his position as the leader of the republican movement.
At one point,
the nominal Minister of Defence in the self-proclaimed Irish provisional
government, Cathal Brugha, (nominal because he did virtually nothing in that
role but was allowed to continue to hold the position), in response to the
murderous British actions in Ireland, ordered a campaign of terror in Great
Britain, involving the assassination of British Cabinet ministers and machine
gun attacks on cinema queues. His order was countermanded by the Chief of Staff
of the IRA. These territorial disputes and political/personal struggles and
enmities continued unaddressed and unresolved. There was no culture of, or
structure for, ideological struggle to address such issues and thus drive the
organisation(s) forward.
Leadership and accountability
The lesson is
that revolutionary organisations require an understanding of the need for
inner-party democracy that enables the membership to supervise the leadership
and hold it accountable, and also for a culture, both formal and real, of
scrutiny and positive criticism, holding leaders to the highest standards.
There was
often a lack of discipline and self-discipline, even among the Irish military
organisations. Many survived often on luck. Michael Collins himself, the most
wanted man by the British, and a brilliant strategist and military leader,
usually displayed great care and attention to detail, but at other times, moved
around in a rather cavalier fashion. He was once caught in a car in a British
roadblock with his three main spies inside the British security apparatus, and
only escaped through luck. He was killed
in the end after refusing to accept advice about his own security.
In the Irish
struggle, the political and military organisations and leaderships were not
well-coordinated, and often out of sync. Collins' strategy of neutralising the
British ruling apparatus by destroying its intelligence agents and networks,
(removing its eyes and ears so that it blundered around blindly), as well as
conducting a guerrilla campaign against the British military, was very
successful. He led the development of a guerrilla strategy that superseded the
explicitly romantic Irish tradition of “an uprising every generation”; these
had always been courageous but desperate attacks, or defences of fixed
positions, against a vastly stronger opponent, and doomed to failure.
However, the guerrilla
strategy was not part of an overall political strategy that defined and pursued
an economic and political program that would rally the Irish people, and create
a set of policies and a structure to displace and replace the British
structures. The military campaign paralysed and destroyed the British military
presence in several counties, but there was no replacement revolutionary
structure.
Negotiations and their lessons
The experience
of the peace negotiations in 1921 provides some salutary lessons.
The movement
needed to be fully committed to the conduct of negotiations. Instead it allowed
DeValera and others to pretend to lead them from afar while distancing
themselves from the realities and difficult decisions.
The movement
needed a clear set of objectives and agreed strategies before entering negotiations.
Only on that basis could decisions be made and the possibilities and outcomes
evaluated.
Leaders must
have the courage to make tough decisions, including compromises when necessary.
Close relations with the membership and the population need to be maintained,
so that the movement's capacity and extant and potential strength can be
accurately gauged. The Irish negotiating team was too isolated in London, away
from the rank-and-file.
The
negotiating team was not a united team.
Some members were excluded from many meetings; too many one-on-one
meetings were held with the likes of the wily, duplicitous, vastly experienced
British Prime Minister, Lloyd George.
There must be
explicit, formal channels of communication with the other side and back to the
revolutionary organisation. All the negotiating team has to be fully involved
and informed, especially when dealing with a vastly more experienced, devious
and powerful opponent such as British imperialism.
The Irish were
correct in insisting that Arthur Griffith be released from jail if he were to
participate in the negotiations. Leaders in jail should never be part of a
negotiating team because they are in such a position of weakness and isolation
from the organisation and masses. (See John Pilger “Freedom Next time” pp
290-298, for an account of how the South African government duchessed and
manipulated the jailed Nelson Mandela in the negotiations to end apartheid. The
Indonesian government moved Xanana Gusmao to a villa so that he could
participate in the negotiations for a referendum in East Timor – he advocated
disarmament and a ceasefire.)
Revolutionary
organisations and their negotiating teams need always to be prepared for the
failure or breakdown of negotiations As the Irish negotiations dragged on,
Collins and at least some of his team were worn down. As happens frequently in
trade union campaigns and negotiations, the objective can be diluted to just
“getting an agreement” rather than the requirement of a good agreement. Collins
said “... it would be a discredit to us all if
after coming together in conference we did not manage to agree”.
Again, clear
objectives, established beforehand, are required.
The British
constantly prepared for the failure of the negotiations. Collins knew that they
were collecting intelligence about identities and locations of the Irish
freedom fighters during the ceasefire so that they could smash the IRA if the
war resumed. Revolutionary organisations should never agree to disarm, and
should maintain their clandestine organisations, even while ceasefires and
negotiations are occurring.
James Connolly
made every effort in this complex and fluid situation to bring the republican
movement closer to a socialist objective.
Connolly advocated a Marxist perspective but did not really move beyond
a syndicalist understanding of the state and revolution. The British
imperialists reserved a special hatred for Connolly, and in the aftermath of
the 1916 Easter Rising, took this mortally wounded comrade to his execution
ground on a stretcher, and shot him strapped to a chair as his injuries
prevented him from standing.
Like all
experiences, the long, brave struggle of the Irish people for independence is
deserving of great respect, and also of careful candid analysis for lessons
that can be learned to enrich the knowledge of the whole revolutionary movement.
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