Written by: (Contributed) on 17 July 2024
Discussions taking place at the highest levels of the Israeli state have revealed planning for prolonged control of Gaza and the West Bank along neo-colonial lines. While various policy options are being considered, none have included any reference to granting recognition of a Palestinian state in accordance with United Nations recommendations decades ago.
In fact, those closely associated with the Netanyahu grouping in the Knesset have already opted for a bantustan-type model for Gaza, based on the former homelands of Apartheid South Africa.
Serious political differences, nevertheless, are emerging inside Israel; some of those which have been not as conspicuous as the mass demonstrations in opposition against Netanyahu, have far-reaching implications for political stability.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected in the US in late July where he is expected to address Congress on 24th about his government plans for the Gaza Strip. Discussions have already started taking place inside the Israeli corridors of power, with various submissions from senior figures. Some of their proposed policy options have already been openly stated: they follow closely the models drawn up by white supremacists in South Africa for containing the black population. (1) With little ambiguity.
The South African homelands, which evolved from the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, became a government priority following the imposition of Apartheid policies in 1950. The white elite sought to permanently remove non-whites from what they regarded as their country. The Bantustans, as they were called, were central to Apartheid policies; they were, furthermore, never intended to be economically sustainable, but dependent upon the white economy with a source of cheap labour for use along lines of a colonial-settler type model.
While differences exist between the Israeli policy options, a common strand running through many of them is a similar preoccupation with 'geographical islands … and … bubbles', designed specifically to atomise the Palestinian community and control the population. (2) Not one proposed policy option has recommended the recognition of a Palestinian state, in line with United Nations recommendations in the late 1980s.
While the Bantustan policies never worked effectively in South Africa, there were, nevertheless, forced re-locations of non-whites from numerous areas. Many non-whites, however, managed to stay in predominantly white areas while subject to government classification as 'non-people'. Needless to state, the Apartheid policies were considered by most reasonable people around the world as odious, and led to opposition and a massive reaction and, eventually, the toppling of the whole segregationalist regime in 1994.
The whole issue of Apartheid has remained highly controversial inside the Israeli state, although there were and remain marked similarities; Israel, for example, retained strong diplomatic links with Apartheid South Africa throughout the duration. (3) Trade links were accompanied by defence and security provision. (4) It was noted that 'much of the efficiency of the South African security services must be placed at the door of Israel, for both army experts and specialists in counter-intelligence operations and interrogation from the MOSSAD have been placed in South Africa in a permanent advisory capacity since 1976 … in that year they … agreed on a pooling of intelligence information'. (5)
In fact, studies of the diplomacy have concluded 'the blatant similarities of these two birds of a feather were vividly illustrated by the worlds of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd – former South African prime minister and architect of 'Grand Apartheid. In 1961, when expressing his deep admiration for Israel's foundation and socio-political architecture – and, more especially for its character as an exclusivist, ethnic state, with special privileges in law for Jews, and the displacement of native Palestinians by foreigners – stated that: The Jews took Israel from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years. Israel like South Africa is an Apartheid State'. (6)
Similar studies, likewise, have also drawn attention to the colonial-settler basis of the Israeli state. (7) The continual expansion of the Israeli settlements across the West Bank is evidence, in itself, of the problem. While the settlements are regarded as illegal by 'much of the international community … Israel has declared control over its single-largest swath of land in the West Bank this year'. (8)
It has also included acts of extreme violence by Israelis toward Palestinian people before the events of 7 October 2023. In April it was officially recorded that 'five Israeli security units committed gross violations of human rights prior to the outbreak of war with Hamas in Gaza … they included … extra-judicial killings, torture and physical abuse'. (9)
One continual problem confronting the Palestinians has been accurately establishing their longer-term planning for their relationship with Israeli motives and designs. Political spin from the Knesset is an everyday occurrence; assessing the Israeli designs, however, would appear a rather different matter. It is not a politically open system, particularly for Palestinian people who are systematically excluded from decision-making processes.
One policy making group, composed of those close to Netanyahu, for example, 'are backing another, security-focussed plan that seeks to slice up Gaza with two corridors running across its width and a fortified perimeter that would allow Israeli's military to mount raids when it deems them necessary'. (10) No reference, however, has been openly given about the massive oil and natural gas reserves off the Gaza Strip and their viability and the geographical significance of the two proposed corridors. The fact that some of the Israeli think tanks are pressing for 'an outright Israeli occupation' of Gaza might best be assessed in that light. (11)
Meanwhile, massive demonstrations and protests have taken place across Israel, backed by political opposition to the Netanyahu administration.
Some of those not so conspicuous opposition figures are, however, in pivotal and powerful positions.
Differences of opinion amongst those who have provided assessments for how Israel should deal with Hamas are important to note; Israel's military leadership, apparently, 'wants a ceasefire in Gaza, even if it means leaving Hamas in charge'. (12) The development has shown a widening difference of opinion between those supporting Netanyahu and those siding with the armed forces. Israel's former national security advisor, Eyal Hulatu, has openly supported a hostage deal which has included a ceasefire. (13)
It has been noted, furthermore, that top Israeli military officials and generals 'see a truce as the best way to secure the release of the hostages, even if Israel's war goals are not all met'. (14) While the position has not been accepted by the Netanyahu administration, it has set the military and its reservists and their associates against a political leadership which is far from secure. In fact, the Netanyahu government is increasingly vulnerable and resides in daily fear of collapsing outright, leaving the military poised near the levers of power.
Other regional figures, including King Abdullah II of Jordan have commented that the exclusion of Palestinians by the Israelis 'will not lead to a real peace'. (15) Jordan clearly has a vested interest in pursuing policies of a peaceful settlement with the Palestinian issue; the country hosts an estimated three million Palestinian refugees in various camps across the country, and is virtually dependent upon the US for defence and security provision. Major developments on the West Bank and Gaza Strip inevitably spill over into neighbouring Jordan; it is not politically secure and in a precarious position.
While the killing of innocent Palestinians continues in Gaza, the Israeli leadership have shown little concern about International Court of Justice recommendations about their war crimes and genocide. (16) The US and their allies continue to support Israel and a culture of impunity. (17)
With world opinion polarised over the issue, however, it remains to be seen what reception Netanyahu and his entourage receive in Washington later this month and whether the Pentagon continues to provide sophisticated armaments for use without conditions, against an unarmed civilian population.
1. See: Israel plans for Gaza 'Day After', Australian, 1 July 2024; and, The Homelands, South African History On-line.
2. Ibid.
3. See: The Unnatural Alliance, James Adams, (London, 1884), page 23, pp. 79-80, page 85.
4. Ibid., page 19, page 23.
5. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
6. Israel and South Africa, The Many Faces of Apartheid, (London, 2015); Birds of a Feather: Israel and Apartheid South Africa – Colonialism of a Special Type, Ronnie Kasrils, pp. 23-41.
7. Ibid., Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4.
8. Record West Bank 'seizure' for settlers, Australian, 5 July 2024.
9. See: US determines five Israeli security units, CNN., 29 April 2024, and, Reuters, 30 April 2024; and, US backs Israel over claims of war crimes, Australian, 1 May 2024.
10. Australian, op.cit.
11. Ibid.
12. Israeli military calls for ceasefire in Gaza, Australian, 4 July 2024.
13. Ibid.
14. Israel evaluating new Hamas 'ideas' on truce, Australian, 5 July 2024.
15. See: Jordan, MEM., 23 September 2024.
16. See: Deadly Israeli strikes hit Gaza, Australian, 8 July 2024.
17. See: Western moral credibility fractured, Pearls and Irritations, 24 May 2024; and, Adelaide Voices, May-July 2024.
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