Written by: (Contributed) on 5 January 2025
Above; December 2024 and South Koreans take to the streets to demand Yoon Suk-yeol's resignation
While government investigators sift through piles of evidence for use by the South Korean Constitutional Court following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, one outstanding matter will be his agenda for attempting to implement martial law in early December.
From available evidence it would appear Yoon Suk-yeon was likely to have been pursuing a longer-term agenda in order to buttress his highly unpopular conservative and business political position, against an increasingly assertive and popular and well organised opposition which have proved problematic for decades.
During his election campaign in 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol stated if elected president his administration would abandon the traditional Blue House for suitable premises elsewhere. The Blue House, however, has a highly symbolic place in the political culture of most South Koreans: having experienced political turmoil and upheaval, the presidential palace is the institution through which they have been governed since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. While other ROK political leaders have expressed concerns about the Blue House, none had ever managed to muster enough support to abandon the vast, sprawling estate.
After winning the presidency with a very small margin, Yoon Suk-yeol announced he was making the former Defence Ministry headquarters his new presidential residence. It was to prove highly unpopular with many South Koreans; during the earliest days of presidential administration a massive public petition of 3,600,000 signatures opposed the move. (1)
The choice by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration to use the Defence Ministry premises, likewise, were to prove unpopular with many South Koreans for reasons the presidential administration appear to not have even considered as relevant.
Most South Koreans, while expected to serve National Service in the country's vast military apparatus, have unhappy memories of military involvement in political and civilian affairs which are regarded as darker days in the country's history. It has been noted, for example, that 'military officers … are by now fully educated about the deep unpopularity of earlier decades of martial law … and that … South Koreans have a deep embrace of democratic values'. (2) The choice of Defence Ministry for the official presidential premises can, therefore perhaps, best be viewed as strangely incongruous; that is, if the choice is to be regarded as straightforward and above board.
What, however, proved a particular matter of concern for many South Koreans were the expensive upgrading of various facilities in the Defence Ministry premises. Security concerns had been raised although it has remained curious how such an important defence facility could be regarded as so vulnerable by those making the assessments. While upgrades were taking place Yoon Suk-yeol used his own home as the presidential premises.
With plummeting popularity ratings Yoon Suk-yeol appeared to have developed a bunker-like mentality even before moving into his Defence Ministry compound, seemingly oblivious to what was taking place in the country as a whole. Government investigators will, no doubt, have a field-day assessing the role of the country's intelligence services and their working relations with the presidential administration; the reliability and nature of the intelligence assessments and those providing the sensitive information, and whether the presidential administration took any notice of what they were being told, has yet to be established but will inevitably be called into question.
Popularity ratings of President Yoon Suk-yeol continued to plummet to under twenty per cent of the population as his administration pursued policies of closer diplomatic involvement with the US and Japan. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) rests upon its diplomatic relationship with Japan as part of a global alliance; co-ordinated involvement with all US regional allies, including the ROK, remain a US political and military obsession. (3)
The April elections saw the political opposition, centred around the Democratic Party, win 192 seats in the 300-seat parliament. While regarded as a landslide victory, it fell just short of a super majority although rendered the presidential administration as little other than a 'lame duck'. (4) Despite attempting to label his political opponents as being North Korean agents, Yoon Suk-yeol provided no credible evidence of any northern involvement in the growing dysfunctional nature of ROK political developments. They remain mere allegations.
The ROK, however, still has legislation from the previous Cold War concerning any relations and contact with the northern DPRK. It remains highly controversial and part of the US-Japan alliance of which the ROK is a component part, for rapid deployment elsewhere in time of crisis. (5) While unpopular, attempts by then President Roo Moo-hyun over twenty years ago to repeal the National Security Law proved highly controversial. (6)
The 1948 law has been seen 'as a legacy of the military dictatorships that dominated South Korea for most of the Cold War'. (7) Fears that President Yoon Suk-yeol would resort to using the draconian legislation against political opposition figures was to become a common concern following their April electoral success, until his demise with impeachment in December.
President Yoon Suk-yeol later announced his move into the new Defence Ministry premises in early November in a manner of being under siege, less than a month before attempting to implement martial law under cover of darkness on the night of 3 December. (8) Why it took those providing the required upgrade over two years to complete the construction and security work has yet to be established. The whole matter, however, looks suspicious and requires clarification, although attempting to implement martial law from inside facilities so closely associated with the ROK's darker history is revealing, in itself.
Nearly 300 ROK uniformed military personnel were subsequently directed by President Yoon Suk-yeol to seize control of the country's parliament, paving the way for full control of the political system; some arrived by helicopter on the roof of the parliamentary buildings.
Opposition political figures barricaded themselves into the parliamentary building and sprayed fire extinguishers at the soldiers, while huge numbers of protesters lined the streets.
Government investigators later established Yoon Suk-yeol had actually authorised the military to 'fire their weapons' at those resisting the attempted coup, in a ten-page report. (9) The personnel concerned, however, refused to accept the order and the Defence Minister subsequently attempted to commit suicide, presumably from disgrace.
And the farce was all over in a mere six hours: the presidential administration appears to have completely misread both the mood of the people and those residing in the state and military apparatus over which they were supposed to have direct and total control.
As ROK government investigators collect legal evidence for forthcoming Constitutional Court proceedings, they will obviously have to consider the longer-term agenda of President Yoon Suk-yeol and his decision to use military force to deal with political opposition on 3 December. It is difficult to accept the decision was taken on the spur of the moment or a planned quick solution to a long-time problem affecting class and state relations in the ROK stretching back decades.
The subsequent impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol's replacement, Acting President Han Duck-soo, for 'actively participating in the insurrection', likewise, has already revealed the deeper and close-knit nature of their conspiracy. (10)
The tentacles of the attempted coup conspiracy may reach very deep indeed.
1. Explained: Why South Korea's president-elect wants to relocate the presidential palace, The Indian Express, 23 March 2022.
2. Real-life political Squid Game offers compelling viewing, The Weekend Australian, 28-29 December 2024.
3. The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
4. Weekend Australian, op.ci.t, 28-29 December 2024.
5. North Korea's behaviour could threaten Australian security, Australian, 27 December 2002.
6. See: Uneasy Korea braced for America's big squeeze, The Guardian Weekly (U.K.), 10-16 December 2004.
7. Ibid.
8. See: Yoon moves into new presidential residence, The Korean Times, 8 November 2024.
9. South Korea's Yoon authorised 'shooting' during martial law bid, prosecutors say, ABC News, (and AFP), 28 December 2024.
10. S. Korean acting leader impeached, The Weekend Australian, 28-29 December 2024.
